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Beyond the Formalism Debate:
Expert Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic,
and Complex Statutes
Edward S. Adams, Daniel A. Farber 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1243 (1999)
Formalists and antiformalists continue to debate the utility of
using legislative history and current social values to interpret statutes.
Lost in the debate, however, is a clear model of how judges actually
make decisions. Rather than focusing on complex problems presented
by actual judicial decisions, formalists and antiformalists concentrate
on stylized examples of simple statutes.
In this Article, Professors Adams and Farber construct a more
functional model of judicial decisionmaking by focusing on complex
problems. They use cognitive psychological research on expert reason-
ing and techniques from an emerging area in the field of artificial
intelligence, fuzzy logic, to construct their model. To probe the complex
interactions between judicial interpretation, the business and legal
communities, and the legislature, the authors apply their model to two
important bankruptcy cases written by prominent formalist judges.
Professors Adams and Farber demonstrate how cognitive psy-
chology and fuzzy logic can reveal the reasoning processes that both
formalist and antiformalist judges use to interpret 'complex statutes.
To apply formalist rules, judges need to recognize the aspects of a case
that trigger relevant rules. Cognitive psychologists have researched
expert reasoning using this type of diagnostic process. Once the judge
identifies the appropriate rules, she will often find they point in con-
flicting directions. Fuzzy logic provides a model of how to analyze such
conflicts.
Next, Professors Adams and Farber consider how these models
of judicial decisionmaking inform efforts to improve statutory interpre-
tation of complex statutes. They reason that expert decisionmaking
builds on pattern recognition skills and fuzzy maps, both the result of
intensive repeated experience. The authors explain that cases involving
complex statutory interpretation frequently involve competing consid-
erations, and that the implicit understandings of field "insiders" tend
to be entrenched and difficult to displace. Consequently, Professors
Adams and Farber argue that judges in specialty courts, such as the
Bankruptcy Courts, are probably in a better position than generalist
appellate judges to interpret complex statutes. Generalist judges
should approach complex statutory issues with a strong degree of defer-
ence to the "local culture" of the field.
Professors Adams and Farber conclude the Article with specula-
tion on how fuzzy logic could be used in a more quantitative way to
model legal problems. They note that computer modeling may ulti-
mately provide insight into the subtle process of judicial practical
reasoning, moving away from the false dichotomy often drawn between
formalist and antiformalist approaches to practical judicial decision-
making.
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Tinkering with [ ] an interconnected system without really knowing how the
modification will affect the overall operation can result in strange, unexpected
outcomes; it can even result in a counterproductive or unjust system.'
Judges tinker with the legal system all the time. Frequently
forced to apply statutes in factual situations never dreamt of by the
drafters of such legislation, judges labor to make the relevant statu-
tory language "fit" the case at issue. The results of such tinkering or
interpretation vary widely. Sometimes such tinkering produces out-
comes that are both unintended and unacceptable, leading to disas-
trous results. Other times judges, like the rest of us, get it right.
Statutory interpretation is currently the subject of a lively
scholarly debate. Should judges render a decision based merely on
the words of the text before them or should they go one step further
and attempt to discern the purpose of the legislation at issue? Is it
legitimate for them to consult current social values? On one side of
the debate are formalists, who eschew legislative history and current
social values while being suspicious of the concept of statutory pur-
pose. On the other side are antiformalists, who prefer to downplay
textual arguments in favor of these other sources of guidance. Anti-
formalists endorse "practical reason"--meaning reliance on complex
judgments regarding text, purpose, legal context, and societal norms.2
Although this is an important debate, the dispute between
these viewpoints has obscured significant aspects of statutory inter-
pretation while highlighting others. As a result, analysis of statutory
1. Hon. Leif M. Clark, Fuzzy Thinking and Legislating Logically, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
14, 14 (1994). This comment was in response to an article that proposed to abolish Chapter 11.
2. For further explanation of practical reasoning, see infra Part H.B.
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interpretation has been skewed. 3 First, the debaters have focused on
the differences between formalism and antiformalism (or "practical
reasoning"), ignoring considerable areas of overlap. Second, much of
the discussion has involved stylized examples, often in the context of
fairly simple statutes, rather than the complexities presented by
actual judicial decisions under complicated modern statutory
schemes. Third, neither side has a very clear model of the process
that judges actually use to make decisions. This Article is intended to
move beyond the current debate about formalism by focusing on these
issues.
This Article seeks to provide more functional models of judicial
decisionmaking. Normally, formalists and antiformalists alike resort
to "hand waving" when seeking to describe the judge's cognitive proc-
ess. This Article will attempt to provide some substance to its de-
scription of this process by referring to work by cognitive psycholo-
gists on expert judgments and to an emerging field known as fuzzy
logic. The latter term-which sounds like a professor's disparage-
ment of an inept first-year student-requires a brief explanation.
What is fuzzy logic? To understand fuzzy logic, one must first
consider its historical antecedents. As early as Aristotle, most theo-
ries of logic have been bivalent.4 Bivalent set theory states that an
object "cannot belong to both a set and its complement set or to nei-
ther of the sets. '5 Computer systems, for example, respond to rules
comprised of combinations of the numbers one or zero.6 In the real
world, bivalent logic can be limiting because it does not recognize that
something may fail to be either A or non-A; it may be partially A and
partially non-A. In contrast, fuzzy logic7 recognizes this possibility,
which seems more descriptive of the realities of legal decision-making.
Pioneered in 1965 by Lotfi Zadeh, fuzzy logic8 recognizes that some-
3. For a brief summary of the current debate, see ABNER J. MILEVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 23-34, 50-54
(1997). For a more extensive discussion, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTER-
PRETATION 107-204 (1994).
4. See The Logic That Dares Not Speak Its Name, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 89.
5. Bart Kosko & Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, SCI. AM., July 1993, at 76.
6. See Suzanne Long, Fuzzy Logic In Focus, HEMISPHERES, Dec. 1994, at 101.
7. See Kosko & Isaka, supra note 5, at 77. The term "fuzzy logic" refers to "any mathe-
matical or computer system that reasons with fuzzy sets." Id.
8. As a science, fuzzy logic has its roots in philosophy and traditional logic. Recognition
that logic could consist of multiple values has its roots in work originally done by Bertrand
Russell at the beginning of the century. Russell recognized that language is inherently vague.
He further noted that vagueness itself was a matter of degree. See DANIEL MCNEILL & PAUL
FREIBERGER, FUZZY LOGIC 29 (1993). Nonetheless, it was Polish logician and philosopher Jan
Lukasiewicz who first developed a form of fuzzy sets. He did this by introducing the value 1/2 to
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thing may be partially in one set while partially in another. In es-
sence, fuzzy logic allows for multivalent levels of validity.9
Fuzzy logic, as well as studies of expert reasoning, shows its
power best in complex situations. As noted earlier, much of the schol-
arly literature about statutory interpretation fails to come to grips
with the full complexity of many modern statutory cases. Rather than
resorting to capsule versions of cases, this Article will consider two
important bankruptcy cases in-depth. Part I of this Article examines
two celebrated, recent bankruptcy decisions which utilize different
varieties of formalism. Two leading formalists, Justice Antonin Scalia
and Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote the opinions. Specifically, Part I
analyzes and critiques the Seventh Circuit decision in Levit v. Inger-
soll Rand Financial Corp. (Deprizio)10 and the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.," which utilize different varie-
ties of formalism. Through an in-depth analysis of these cases, we
probe the complex interactions between judicial interpretation, the
business and legal communities, and the legislature.
Part II shows how cognitive psychology and fuzzy logic can
illuminate the reasoning processes used by formalist and anti-
formalist judges alike. In order to apply formalist rules, judges need
to recognize the aspects of a case that trigger relevant rules. Cogni-
tive psychologists have researched expert reasoning using this type of
diagnostic process. Once the judge has identified the appropriate
rules, she may find that they point in conflicting directions. Fuzzy
logic provides a model of how to analyze such conflicts.
Part III considers how these models of judicial decision-making
might inform efforts to improve statutory interpretation of complex
statutes like the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, this Article argues
that expert decisionmaking builds on pattern recognition skills and
fuzzy maps, both the result of intensive repeated experience. Conse-
quently, bankruptcy judges are probably in a better position than
generalist appellate judges to maneuver among the complexities of
the traditional values of 1 and 0, which recognized that, in addition to A and non-A, something
might be partially A or partially non-A. This opened the door to inserting an infinite number of
values between 1 and 0. See id. at 29-31. It was not until 1965, however, when Lotfi Zadeh
published Fuzzy Sets that modem fuzzy set theory was created. Using the work of Russell and
Lukasiewicz, Zadeh further recognized that something could belong to some extent in one set as
well as another. Based on these assumptions, he developed a mathematical formula for fuzzy
sets. See generally Lotfi A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8 INFO. & CONTROL 338-353 (1965). Most work
currently being done utilizing fuzzy logic originated with this groundbreaking work.
9. See The Logic That Dares Not Speak Its Name, supra note 4, at 89.
10. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
11. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
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the Code and to accommodate the values and interests at stake. Also,
because of the complexity of these statutory schemes and of the corre-
sponding fuzzy cognitive maps, judges would do well to acknowledge
that competing considerations are involved in almost every interest-
ing case. The implicit understandings of bankruptcy "insiders," both
in the legislative process and in bankruptcy practice and adjudication,
are strongly entrenched and difficult to displace. In short, generalist
judges should approach bankruptcy issues with a strong degree of
deference to the "local culture" of the field.
This Article closes with some speculation about how fuzzy logic
could be used in a more quantitative way to model legal problems.
Although the efforts presented in this Article are quite preliminary,
they suggest ground for hope that computer modeling may ultimately
provide insight into the subtle process of judicial practical reasoning.
I. LEVIT V. INGERSOLL RAND FINANCIAL CORP. (DEPRIzIO)
AND BFP V. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP.
A. Sections 547 and 548: A Primer
A realistic appraisal of statutory interpretation requires the
use of realistic examples, such as the Bankruptcy Code. For the non-
bankruptcy specialist, some background on the relevant code provi-
sions may be useful.
Bankruptcy law aims to distribute the bankruptcy estate to
the debtor's creditors and equity-holders in an order that corresponds
to the prescribed hierarchy of classes.12 Prior to bankruptcy, creditors
often rush to collect their claims or to receive payments in order to
avoid this prescribed hierarchy. This rush to payment increases the
likelihood of the debtor's bankruptcy, reduces the assets available for
distribution, and undermines bankruptcy law's primary goals of order
and equality of distribution. 13
To prevent this "rush to payment," the Bankruptcy Code
"grants the trustee or the debtor in possession certain avoiding or
avoidance powers.' 4 These powers "allow the trustee or debtor in
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994).
13. See 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 6-3, at 278 (1993).
14. Steve H. Nickles & Edward S. Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorneys' Pockets (and the
Dilemma of Paying for Bankruptcy), 78 MINN. L. REV. 1079, 1109 (1994). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor and bona fide purchaser and as successor to actual
creditors); 545 (statutory liens); 546(c) (reclamation); 547(b) (preferences); 548(a) & (b) (fraudu-
lent transfers and obligations); 549(a) (postpetition transfers); and 553(a) (b) (setof0 (1994).
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possession to undo and recover some prebankruptcy transfers of the
debtor's property and most postbankruptcy transfers of the estate's
property."'15 In turn, the trustee either distributes this recovered
property to unsecured creditors and equity-holders according to the
Code's priority scheme or gives it to the requisite secured party if it is
secured collateral. Deprizio addresses § 547(b) 16 of the Code, which
allows the trustee to avoid "a transfer of the debtor's property on the
eve of bankruptcy to satisfy an old debt,"' 7 and § 550(a)18 of the Code,
which allows a recovery of a preferential pre-petition transfer. BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp.'9 addresses § 54820 of the Code, which empow-
ers the trustee to avoid a fraudulent transfer of the debtor's property.
15. Nickles & Adams, supra note 14, at 1109.
16. Section 547(b) provides:
Except as providpd in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of
an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was
an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). This is § 547(b) as amended in 1984. The version in force in 1983,
which applied to the Deprizio case, applied the year-long voidable preference section only if the
requirement of § 547 (b)(4)(B)(ii) was met, which required the insider to have "reasonable cause
to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer." Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin.
Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Deprizio].
17. Elizabeth A. Orelup, Note, Avoidance of Preferential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 65 IOWA L. REV. 209, 214-215 (1979).
18. Section 550(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided un-
der section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may re-
cover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders,
the value of such property, from
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1994).
19. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 535-36 (1994).
20. Section 548 provides in relevant part:
1999] FUZZY LOGIC 1249
Subject to the requirements of § 547(b) of the Code, a trustee
or debtor in possession can "avoid 21 any transfer 22 of the debtor's
estate that "prefers" one creditor over another. 23 Under § 547(b)(4),
the trustee may only recover those transfers made within 90 days
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition unless the transfer was
made to an "insider,"24 in which case the period is extended to one
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year be-
fore the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntary or involuntary--
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became,
on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, indebted; or
(B)
(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(ii) (I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred, or became
insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation...
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
21. In bankruptcy, "avoid" means the power given to a bankruptcy trustee to set aside any
transaction that is improper.
22. The Code defines "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in prop-
erty, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemption." 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). A preference is any transfer of the debtor's property on
the eve of or in contemplation of bankruptcy which satisfies an old debt.
24. Section 101(31) of the Code defines an "insider" to include:
(A) if the debtor is an individual--
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person
in control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation--
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in
control of the debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership--
(i) general partner of the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner, director or officer person in
control of the debtor;
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative of
an elected official of the debtor;
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year.25  Since the Code bifurcates the treatment of avoidance and
recovery issues, once a transfer is found to be preferential under
§ 547, § 550 identifies the parties from whom the trustee or debtor in
possession can recover the transfer.26 Section 550(a) permits the
trustee to recover the transfer from the "initial transferee" or from
any "entity for whose benefit such transfer was made. '27
Bankruptcy Code § 548 allows a trustee to avoid a fraudulent
transfer 28 of the debtor's property, or any obligation the debtor
fraudulently made or incurred within one year prior to filing the
bankruptcy petition.29 Section 548 contains provisions similar to the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA") and the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfers Act ('UFTA"). These two Acts condemn trans-
fers that are both actually and constructively fraudulent.30 An actual
fraudulent transfer occurs under § 548 when the debtor acts "with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the
debtor was ... indebted."3' Since direct evidence of requisite intent is
rarely available, courts have accepted circumstantial evidence, in the
form of badges of fraud, as sufficient.3 2 Although the trustee bears
the burden of proof, "certain combinations of these badges of fraud
create [ ] a presumption of fraudulent intent, shifting the burden of
(E) affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor;
and
(F) managing agent of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1994).
25. Section 547 strives to discourage creditors "from racing to the courthouse to dismem-
ber the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy" in order to "facilitate the primary bankruptcy
policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a
greater payment than others of its class is required to disgorge so that all may share equally."
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177-78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138.
26. See supra note 18 for the text of § 550(a).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1994).
28. See supra note 22 for the definition of "transfer" in the Code. For the purposes of §
548, the term includes not only a sale, gift or other absolute, voluntary conveyance of the
debtor's interest in property, but various other dispositions as well. See Nickles & Adams,
supra note 14, at 1115-16 n.148.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
30. 'Until 1918, American jurisdictions either recognized the Statute of Elizabeth [13,
Chapter 5 (condemned any conveyance of property made with the intent "to delay, hinder or
defraud creditors')] as part of their inherited common law or enacted identical or very similar
versions of it." Nickles & Adams, supra note 14, at 1114. The UFTA and the UFCA cover
transfers the debtor made with the intent to defraud (actually fraudulent) and those transfers
that are irrespective of the debtor's intent if the court deems such transfers to be unfair to the
debtor's creditors (constructively fraudulent).
31. Nickles & Adams, supra note 14, at 1117 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988)). The
debt may have arisen on or after the date of the transfer at issue. See id.
32. See id. at 1117.
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proof to the transferee to establish the lack of any actual fraudulent
intent."
33
Alternatively, a transfer is constructively fraudulent when the
debtor made the transfer for less than "reasonably equivalent value"
34
and the debtor was or thereby became insolvent;35 was engaged in
business with unreasonably small capital;36 or intended to incur debts
that would exceed her ability to pay.37 The purpose of § 548 is mani-
festly simple: to protect a debtor's other creditors from unfair reduc-
tions in the debtor's estate.38
The Seventh Circuit's landmark decision in Deprizio39 ex-
panded the scope of § 547 preference provisions to include payments
made by the debtor to one of its lenders an entire year before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, if the loan was guaranteed by an
insider of the debtor company. The more controversial aspect of the
case centers on the court's formalist approach to § 550(a) which,
through the court's literal reading of the section, allowed the trustee
to seek a recovery not only from the inside guarantors of these loans,
but also from the lenders who received the payments as well.
40
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in BFP,41 courts had
struggled to develop a framework to ascertain "reasonably equivalent
value" under § 548(a)(2). 42 In a triumph for mortgage lenders, BFP
33. Id. at 1118.
34. "In deciding whether something the debtor received in exchange for a transfer is
'reasonably equivalent value,' the court must determine whether the debtor received 'value' and,
if so, how the value received compared to the property that she transferred or the obligation she
incurred in exchange therefor." Nickles & Adams, supra note 14, at 1118 n.155. Section 548
defines "value" as "property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the
debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a
relative of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1994).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) ("insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation").
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)(B)(ii).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)(B)(iii).
38. As a result of this protection, creditors "need not monitor debtors so closely, and the
savings in monitoring costs make businesses more productive." Nickles & Adams, supra note
14, at 1121 (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir.
1988)).
39. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1197, 1200-01 (7th Cir.
1988).
40. See id. at 1196-97.
41. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S 531 (1994).
42. The circuits had adopted one of the following three approaches: Durrett v. Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980) (establishing a price bid at foreclosure sale to be
at least 70 percent of the property's fair market value) [hereinafter "Durrett approach']; Law-
yers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 427 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), affid on
other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984) (establishing a price received at a regularly con-
ducted foreclosure sale is conclusively presumed to be reasonably equivalent value) [hereinafter
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established a bright-line rule that the price received at a noncollusive,
properly conducted foreclosure sale conclusively establishes reason-
ably equivalent value for the purposes of § 548.43 The Court rejected
fair market value as a benchmark for evaluating mortgage-foreclosure
sales under § 548 based upon the text of the Code and the market
conditions present at the forced sale of property.
A more detailed analysis of these celebrated cases follows
below. Because our goal is to explore the interpretation of complex
statutory problems, we will examine the ramifications of each in
detail.
B. Deprizio
In April 1983, the V.N. Deprizio Construction Company filed
for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Code.44  Shortly
thereafter, the proceeding converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation and a
trustee was appointed.45 At the time of the filing, the debtor had
several groups of creditors. 46  First, the debtor had borrowed money
from various lenders. Richard Deprizio, the debtor's president, and
his brothers Robert and Edward, all insiders47 of the company, per-
sonally guaranteed some of Deprizio's debts to these lenders.4 Sec-
ond, when the debtor fell behind in its payments to the employee
pension and welfare funds, it executed notes in the funds' favor se-
cured by a junior lien on the debtor's assets that Richard Deprizio co-
signed. Third, the debtor was delinquent in the payment of with-
holding taxes to the Internal Revenue Service. The year prior to the
filing of bankruptcy the debtor made a number of payments to each of
these creditors. 49
"Madrid approach"]; Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 1988) (bank-
ruptcy court should make a case-by-case determination of reasonable equivalency by weighing
all the relevant facts) [hereinafter "Bundles approach"].
43. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 549.
44. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio II), 86 B.R. 545, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See supra note 24 for the text of § 101(31) of the Code defining insider.
48. See Deprizio II, 86 B.R. at 549.
49. The scope of this Article is limited to the Seventh Circuit's holding concerning the
Lender Creditors and the Trustee's right to recover payments made to them by the Debtor. The
Seventh Circuit found that there could be no recovery under § 550(a) for payment of delinquent
taxes made to the IRS more than ninety days before the filing of bankruptcy, because even
though the insiders of the company may be held liable for the company's failure to pay taxes,
they were not creditors of Deprizio because they held no right to reimbursement from the
company. Concerning the Trustee's claim against the Funds, the court held that there could be
recovery of payments made by the Debtor but only to the extent that state law allowed it. The
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When the case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the
trustee, asserting his power to avoid preferential transfers and re-
cover their value for the estate, brought an adversary proceeding
against the creditors. He sought a declaratory judgment that any
payments made between ninety days and one year prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy petition to the creditors were voidable preferences
under § 547.5o To succeed in this proceeding, the trustee had to show
not only that the payments made to the creditors were preferential
transfers under § 547, but also that § 550 allowed recovery of the
payments from the parties. According to the trustee, the insiders,
Richard, Edward, and Robert Deprizio, were actually creditors within
the meaning of § 101(9) 51 because they held a right to a contingent
claim against the debtor. The trustee argued that the payments made
to the lenders more than ninety days but less than one year preceding
bankruptcy were voidable preferences, since every reduction in the
amounts owed the lenders reduced the extent to which the insiders
would be exposed on their guarantees. 52 Thus, every payment was
"for the benefit" of the insiders because it reduced the amount of
reimbursement that the lenders could ultimately seek. The trustee
further argued that § 550(a) allowed recovery of the preferential
transfers directly from the initial transferees-in this case, the lend-
ers.
53
The bankruptcy court dismissed the trustee's action and held
for the lenders.54 The court focused on whether the payments made to
the lenders, which indirectly benefited the insiders, created a prefer-
court remanded for further review. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d
1186, 1200 (7th Cir 1988).
50. See In re V.N. Deprizio Const. (Deprizio 111), 58 B.R. 478, 479 (Bankr. N.D. M11. 986).
51. Then § 101(9)(A) (now § 101(10)(A)) defined a "creditor" to mean an "entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1988) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (1994)). A
"claim" means a "right to payment, whether or not such a right is ... contingent." 11 U.S.C. §
101(4)(A) (1988) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994)).
For example, XYZ Co. cannot meet the obligations it has to its lender. Since the lender has
a guarantee from XYZ's president, the lender may recover from the guarantor. At this point the
guarantor, the president of XYZ Co., may seek recovery from XYZ Co. Therefore, a guarantor
has a contingent claim against the debtor and is a "creditor" of the debtor under section
101(9)(A).
Virtually every court addressing the issue has so held. See, e.g., In re Foland & Co., 55 B.R.
593, 594 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Big Three Transp., Inc., 41 B.R. 16, 19 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1983); In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 B.R. 888, 892 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983).
52. See Deprizio III, 58 B.R. at 480.
53. Trustee relied for support for his position on In re Big Three Transp., Inc., 41 B.R. 16,
21 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983), which held that the unambiguous language of 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1)
provides for the trustees right to recover for the non-insider creditor.
54. See Deprizio III, 58 B.R. at 480.
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ential transfer that was recoverable under § 550 from the lenders.55
The court adopted a two-transfer theory56 approach to the issue, as
relied upon in In re Mercon Industries.57 The court viewed the single
payment to the non-insider as effecting two transfers under the Code:
one directly to the lenders in satisfaction of the primary indebtedness;
and one indirectly to the insiders in satisfaction of their contingent
liability. The bankruptcy court applied the voidable preference analy-
sis under § 547(b) separately to each transfer. As the court noted, the
transfer to the lenders was simply an ordinary transfer and thus the
ninety-day preference period applied. More specifically, the court
concluded that the lenders were not themselves insiders "at the time
of such transfer" as required by statute in order to extend the prefer-
ence period to one year from the filing of the petition.58 The court did
allow recovery of the monetary transfer under § 550(a) from the insid-
ers because the indirect benefit they received was a preferential
transfer under § 547(b).59 Hence, the transfer was subject to the one-
year expanded preference period which applies to "insiders. '60 The
court held that § 550(a) limited the trustee's recovery "to the extent
that a transfer is avoided under § 547.''61 Since the transfers to the
lenders were subject only to the ordinary ninety-day preference pe-
riod, recovery under the expanded one-year preference period would
be limited to the extent that the insiders benefited from the pay-
ments.
62
55. See id. at 480-81.
56. The two-transfer theory holds that the definition of transfer is broad enough to
encompass that the satisfaction, partial or whole, of an insider guarantor's contingent claim
against the debtor is independent of the transfer from the debtor to the lender who holds the
guarantee. See In re Mercon Indus., Inc., 37 B.R. 549, 552 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). Pursuant
to this theory, the two separate transfers must each independently meet the elements of §
547(b) for the trustee to invoke her avoidance powers.
57. Id. at 551.
58. See supra note 16 for the text of § 547(b).
59. See Deprizio III, 58 B.R. at 480.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The court stated in dicta that even if the transfers to the lenders were found to be
avoidable pursuant to § 547(b), the "weight of authority would not recognize the right of the
trustee to recover from these creditors under § 550(a)" based upon the court's equitable powers.
These decisions have for the most part relied on a passage from a leading bankruptcy treatise:
in some circumstances, where a literal application of section 550(a) would permit the trustee to
"recover from a party who acted merely as a conduit, the bankruptcy court should use its
equitable powers to prevent an inequitable result." 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 550.02, at
550-15 (15th ed. 1998). Other cases which considered the issue rely on the bankruptcy court's
equitable powers to preclude the trustee from recovering from innocent creditors who were the
initial transferees. See, e.g., In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc., 96 B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989);
In re Midwestern Cos., 96 B.R. 224 (Bankr W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 B.R. 77
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 B.R. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); In re
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On interlocutory appeal by the trustee, the district court re-
versed.63 The court rejected the two-transfer approach of the bank-
ruptcy court, and held both that: (1) the payments made to the lend-
ers were preferential transfers under § 547(b) and subject to an ex-
tended reach back period of one year; and (2) the payments made by
the debtor could be recovered under § 550(a) from the lenders as
"initial transferees. '' 64 The court relied on the broad definition of
creditor in the Code, which includes guarantors. 65 The court reasoned
that the debtor's payments benefited both the lenders who received
the payments and also those creditors who were guarantors. 66 Rely-
ing on the plain language of § 547(b)(4)(B), which expands the prefer-
ence period when "such creditor" is an insider, the court found that
"such creditor" refers back to § (b)(1)-the creditor to whom or for
whose benefit the transfer occurred.
67
Turning to the issue of recoverability of the transfer, the dis-
trict court found the two-transfer theory of the bankruptcy court
contrary to the literal reading of § 547. The district court asserted
that the bankruptcy court misconceived the nature of "transfer"
68
under the Code by defining it from the creditor's point of view,
equating it with "benefit received. '69 Rather, the district court said
that the Code defines "transfer" from the payor's point of view re-
gardless of the number of parties that may benefit from it.70 Looking
at the intent of Congress, the court found that if "Congress had
wanted a transfer to occur whenever someone receive[d] a benefit, it
could have defined 'transfer' as 'receiving or acquiring property or an
interest in property.' ",71
Cove Patio Corp., 19 B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Duccilli Formal Wear, Inc., 18 B.R.
1180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Church Buildings & Interiors, Inc., 4 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D.
Mass. 1981).
63. See In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co. (Deprizio 11), 86 B.R. 545, 556 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
64. Id. at 551.
65. See id. at 550 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(a) (1983) (containing the definition of "credi-
tor)).
66. Id.
67. Because in this case the debtor's payment on debt guaranteed by Richard Deprizio was
for the benefit of an insider, the court concluded that the expanded preference period applied.
See id.
68. See supra note 22 for the definition of "transfer" in the Code.
69. The bankruptcy court considered there to be two transfers since there was a benefit to
two parties: the Lender Creditors and the Insider Guarantors.
70. See Deprizio II, 86 B.R. at 551. The Code defines "transfer" as occurring when some-
one "dispos[es] of or part[s] with property or with an interest in property." 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)
(1994). See supra note 22 for the full text.
71. Deprizio II, 86 B.R. at 551.
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Once the district court disposed of the two-transfer theory, it
turned to § 550. The district court acknowledged prior authority,72
but refused to overlook the clear and unambiguous language of the
section. It adopted a literal reading which "expressly recognize[d]
that one transfer may benefit both an outsider creditor and an insider
guarantor and permit[ted] recovery from either the 'initial transferee'
or 'the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made.' -73 The court
relied upon the minority view expressed by In re Big Three Transpor-
tation, Inc.
74
The district court went on to say, "[w]here Congress has
crafted an unambiguous comprehensive statutory scheme, such as it
has in the Code, we are extremely hesitant to tamper with that
scheme by use of vague equitable powers. '75 According to the court,
there was no inequity in forcing a creditor to return payments that it
received only because the debtor had engaged in preferential behav-
ior.76 Further, since one of the purposes of a guarantee was to provide
the lender a second pocket to recover from in the event of default, the
court said that it "s[aw] nothing inequitable in requiring the creditor
to pursue the guarantor once the debtor bec[ame] insolvent-indeed
that [was] precisely what the creditor bargained for in obtaining the
guarantee.
'77
The Seventh Circuit, in an unanimous decision authored by
Judge Easterbrook, affirmed the district court's decision, holding that
payments made to the lenders by the debtor were subject to a year-
long preference-recovery period under § 547(b)(4)(B), when those pay-
ments were for the benefit of insiders.78 The court also affirmed the
72. See id. at 550-51 (citations omitted). The court recognized that the accepted majority
view was that recovery could only "be had from the insider based either on the two-transfer
theory or the equitable approach theory.
73. Id.
74. The Arkansas Bankruptcy Court stated that the language in section 550(a)(1) was:
susceptible of no other interpretation than the result reached herein. The drafters of
the Code could very easily have omitted the 'initial transferee' language. Since they ob-
viously did not, however, drafters of loan guaranty agreements will have to consider the
literal meaning of § 550(a)(1) in advising their lending institution clients.
In re Big Three Transp. Inc., 41 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
75. Deprizio I, 86 B.R. at 552.
76. See id. at 552-53. The non-insider creditors in this case only got paid because of the
existence of the guarantee. According to the court it was reasonable to assume that when an
insolvent company pays a guaranteed debt over its other debts, it is reasonable to presume that
the motive is to benefit the guarantor.
77. Id. at 553. Even if the guarantor is now insolvent, the creditor bargains for and bears
that risk at the time of the initial agreement and throughout the relationship.
78. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1200-01 (7th Cir.
1989). The court only affirmed the district court's decision as to the transfers made to creditors
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district court's reading of § 550(a) that allowed the Trustee to recover
the payment from the lender as an "initial transferee."
79
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by pointing out that
while no other appellate court had addressed the issue before it, sev-
eral bankruptcy and district courts, as well as commentators, had.
80
Despite the apparent inequity that several courts and commentators
had recognized in allowing a recovery from a non-insider creditor, the
Seventh Circuit stated, an "ordinary" reading of the Code necessitated
just such a conclusion."' The court first addressed whether there was
an avoidable preference under § 547. Easterbrook agreed with the
trustee that, since the debtor's repayments to the lenders reduced the
outstanding loan balances and diminished the degree to which these
lenders could compel the insiders to honor their guarantees, these
payments were "for the benefit" of the insiders.8 2 Accepting that the
transfer to the lenders was preferential, and hence avoidable under
§ 547(b), the court then turned to § 550(a) to determine liability for
repayment.
83
The Seventh Circuit, relying on the district court's reasoning,
rejected the "two-transfer" theory as contrary to the clear language of
who had secured a personal guarantee from an insider. The court reversed as to the payments
made to the employee plans and the federal government because there were no guarantees from
insiders for these obligations.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1188 (citations omitted). While acknowledging that the majority of courts
refused to extend the preference period to one year for non-insider lenders who had guarantees
from insiders based on either the two-transfer theory or the courts' equitable powers, the court
affirmed the district court's following of the minority of courts because of its reliance on the text
of the Code and congressional intent. The court does mention that the commentators are evenly
divided upon the issue. Compare 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 550.02, at 550-10 (15th. ed. 1998)
and Vern Countryman, The Trustee's Recovery in Preference Actions, 3 BANKR. DEVS. J. 449, 464
(1986) (both saying "no" to extending the preference period on grounds of the perceived inequity
of treating the diligent lender who took a guarantee from an insider differently than a lender
who did not), with Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections
547(c)(2), 550(a)(1) and 546(a)(1), 41 BUS. LAW. 175, 186-99 (1985), and Thomas E. Pitts, Jr.,
Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343 (1981) (both answering
"yes" to extending the period).
81. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1198.
82. Id. at 1189 (relying on the interlocked sections of the Code: §§ 101(4)(A), 101(9), 547(b)
and 550(a)).
83. See id at 1190. The four requirements for a finding of an avoidable preference are: (1)
insider-as defined in § 101(30); (2) benefit-the insider must have some form of personal
liability (albeit contingent) on the debt being repaid that will be reduced by the debtor's repay-
ments; (3) creditor-the insider, upon activation of its liability, must have a claim against the
debtor; (4) lack-of-defenses requirement-the lender must not qualify for one of the § 547
defenses. The court noted that while § 547 distinguishes as to whether the Guarantor is an
"insider," § 550 does not. Section 550(a) allows recovery from either "initial transferee" or the
"entity for whose benefit such transfer was made." 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1994).
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§ 550(a) and the definition of transfer in § 101(30).84 The language in
§ 550(a) that limits a trustee to a recovery "to the extent that a trans-
fer is avoided," the court said, is there simply to provide for those
situations where less than the full amount of a transfer can be
avoided and does not mean that a single payment can constitute
multiple transfers.
8 5
Relying not just on the provision's literal meaning but also on a
purpose approach, Easterbrook wrote, "[t]he trustee's power to avoid
preferences ... is essential to make the bankruptcy case a collective
proceeding for the determination and payment of debts. '8 6  In the
court's view, the trustee's avoiding powers served all the creditors in
two ways:
first, they eliminate the benefit of attaching assets out of the ordinary course
in the last 90 days before the filing, so that the rush to dismember a firm is not
profitable from a creditor's perspective; second, the avoiding powers assure
each creditor that if it refrains from acting, the pickings of anyone less civil
will be fetched back into the pool.
87
The court concluded that the ninety-day preference period established
by Congress was sufficient to allow reasonably alert lenders to protect
themselves, but that in the case of insiders special problems arise due
to the intimate knowledge they possess on the health of the busi-
ness.8 The court further found that the Trustee's ability to recover
from the lenders ensured that the Trustee would determine the "ulti-
mate distribution of the debtor's net assets" rather than the "efforts of
insiders to protect their own interests."89
In addition to relying on the text and purpose of the Code,
Judge Easterbrook also examined the Code's legislative history for the
meaning of "initial transferee" in § 550(a)(1). The court, along with
the parties, drew different inferences from the legislative silence on
the issue. The lenders argued that the silence evidenced congres-
84. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195-96.
85. Id. The Lender Creditors argued that the language in § 550, "to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section . . . 547" means that § 547 recovery must be satisfied with
respect to the party from whom recovery is sought under § 550. The Seventh Circuit saw no
support for linkage between the two sections in the Code.
86. Id. at 1194.
87. Id. (citing Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725,
727-31, 756-68 (1984)).
88. See id. This knowledge may be used to their advantage when paying off debts, thus
disrupting the bankruptcy process if the preference period is only ninety days. As the court
noted, invoking the one-year preference period makes it unlikely that insiders would be able to
prefer themselves.
89. Id. at 1195.
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sional intent to continue the practice under the pre-1978 Bankruptcy
Act of recovering payments only from parties to whom the transfer
represented a preference. 90 Judge Easterbrook disagreed, stating
that, "[w]hen Congress makes wholesale changes in the text and
structure of the law, it is fatuous to pretend that a silent legislative
history means that existing practices should continue unchanged."91
Easterbrook pointed out that the silence in the Committee Report
92
was not informative because it was the "novel text of section 550(a)(1)
... that underlies the Trustee's claim.. . and that change [in the
text] did not happen until five years after the Report.
'93
Easterbrook steadfastly rejected the bankruptcy court's equity
arguments. 94 He did not see any inequity in requiring the outside
lenders to pursue the inside guarantors for any shortfall they encoun-
tered, since that was the situation for which they had bargained. 95 In
90. See id. at 1196.
91. Id.
92. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
DOC. No. 93-137 (1973).
93. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1197 n.9. In short, according to Judge Easterbrook:
An extended recovery period is consistent with the structure of the Code and does not
subvert any of its functions. A longer period when insiders reap benefits by preferring
one outside creditor over another facilitates the operation of bankruptcy as a collective
process and ensures that each creditor will receive payment according to the Code's pri-
orities and non-bankruptcy entitlements. Silence in the legislative history therefore
does not require or authorize a court to depart from the text and structure of the Code.
Id. (citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 133-38 (1989); United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
94. See Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 894-95 (7th Cir.
1988); In re Iowa R.R., 840 F.2d 535, 536 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986); Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp., 785
F.2d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206
(1988) ("[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.!).
Easterbrook argued that equity arguments are inapplicable to this situation because
"[r]ules of law affecting parties to voluntary arrangements do not operate 'inequitably' in the
business world-at least not once the rule is understood." Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1197. The court
interpreted the preference provisions of the Code to be clear and unambiguous. Thus, equitable
arguments would be inadmissible. Furthermore, as a matter of policy no "inequity" resulted to
the Lender Creditors. The extended-preference period, whether it had a positive or negative
effect on the extension of credit, still allowed creditors to receive a competitive rate of return in
financial markets. While the rule may have had the effect of foreclosing efficient business
arrangements and increasing the interest low risk borrowers pay, "inefficiency is not inequity."
Id.
95. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1197. Easterbrook also rejected the policy arguments
advocated by the creditors. He rejected their theory that an extended preference-recovery
period will cause a stampede from workouts to bankruptcies. Nor did he see the inequity in
recapturing "payments to creditors that may have been favored only because payment reduced
insiders' exposure . . . then distribut[ing] these monies according to statutory priorities and
contractual entitlements." Id.
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dictum, the court contended that the Lender Creditor's concerns about
the "pernicious consequences" of adopting its holding would not actu-
ally burden creditors to any significant degree because §§ 547(b)(5)96
and 547(c) 97 "excluded from recovery bulk or ordinary commercial
payments."98
To summarize, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the trustee
and held that because insiders benefited from the payments made to
the lenders, the preference period should be extended to one year.
Even though the payments were preferential only because of the
benefit to the insiders, the court permitted recovery of payments from
the lenders based upon a literal reading of § 550(a) and supported by
a reading of the purposes and policies behind the Code provision.
1. Reaction to Deprizio
Both scholars and the business community took immediate
notice of the Seventh Circuit ruling. The debate among legal com-
mentators regarding the soundness of the Deprizio decision has been
resounding. Many commentators severely criticized the decision and
96. Section 547(b)(5) "enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been
made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provi-
sions of the title." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1994).
97. Section 547(c) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) To the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer
was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the
debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value [in the nature of a
purchase money security interest]...
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor
gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise
unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor ....
11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1994) (as amended in 1984 to eliminate the former requirement in § 547(c)(2)
that the payment come within forty-five days of the debt to count as one in due course, a
qualifier that potentially allowed the trustee to recover all installment payments).
98. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1199.
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warned of possible dire implications for the lending industry.99 In
response, Professor Jay Westbrook argued that the fear about De-
prizio was misplaced. 100 He argued that commercial lenders would
adapt quickly to the decision, just as they did to equally controversial
decisions, and believed that as such, the decision would become part
of the commercial landscape. 1 1 He identified two shortcomings in the
debate surrounding Deprizio: (1) the failure to address the distinction
between "true economic value" and "pure-leverage" guarantees; and
(2) the technical requirement that the insider be a "creditor" of the
debtor. 0
2
Westbrook's primary concern was the underlying policy issue
presented in Deprizio: preference policy as applied to insider guaran-
tees. Acknowledging that the leverage generated by an inside guar-
antee threatens the antidismemberment and equality of distribution
policies promoted by the Bankruptcy Code, Westbrook agreed with
Easterbrook's policy analysis that "[o]nly recovery against the posses-
sors of that leverage, the lenders themselves, [would] mitigate its
undesirable effects.
'10 3
Deprizio, Westbrook argued, would not affect "true guarantee"
situations. 0 4  The lender may have had to repay the trustee the
99. See, e.g., Donald W. Baker, Repayments of Loans Guaranteed by Insiders as Avoidable
Preferences in Bankruptcy: Deprizio and Its Aftermath, 23 UCC L.J. 115, 147 (1990) (arguing
that Deprizio is unsound and should be reconsidered); Robert F. Higgins & David E. Peterson, Is
There A One-Year Preference Period for Non-Insiders?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383, 383-84 (1990)
(criticizing Deprizio for the risks it raises for non-insider creditors); Henk J. Brands, Note, The
Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 530, 532-
33 (1989) (proposing that recovery from the non-insider should be based on § 550(a)(2) rather
than § 550(a)(1)); John Stephen Cullina, Comment, Recharacterizing Insider Preferences as
Fraudulent Conveyances: A Different View of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand, 77 VA. L. REV. 149, 149-52,
156-59 (1991) (arguing that Code should be amended to characterize transfers that benefit
insiders as fraudulent conveyances); Andrew J. Nussbaum, Note, Insider Preferences and the
Problem of Self-Dealing Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 614 (1990) (criti-
cizing courts for not characterizing transfers involving insiders according to their substantive
impact); James A. Rodenberg, Note, Indirect Preferences: Recovery Under Sections 547 and 550
of the Bankruptcy Code, 55 MO. L. REV. 327, 342-50 (1990) (arguing that the Code does not
require the preference period to be extended for non-insider lenders); Mark E. Toth, Comment,
The Impossible State of Preference Law Under The Bankruptcy Code: Levit v. Ingersoll Rand
Financial Corp. and the Problem of Insider-Guaranteed Debt, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1168-75
(asserting that the preference sections as currently applied will not adequately deal with the
insider-guaranteed debt scenario). But see Thomas E. Pitts, Jr., Insider Guarantees and the
Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343 (1981) (arguing that § 550(a)(1) should be read
literally and that the financial community will adapt to this interpretation).
100. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 73, 73 (1991).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 74.
103. Id. at 77.
104. Id. at 81.
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amount of an avoidable transfer, but the lender would have a solvent
guarantor from whom to recover (or most likely to join in the original
action). The trustee may even have chosen to recover from the guar-
antor directly.10 5 On the other hand, the lender with a "pure leverage
guarantee" would have felt Deprizio head on: the lender would have to
pay the trustee directly but would be unable to collect from the guar-
antors. Thus, those lenders with true guarantees were protected
despite Deprizio, while those lenders with pure leverage guarantees
were not. According to Westbrook, the preference provisions were
designed for exactly this type of situation. 106 Allowing a recovery from
lenders in the pure leverage situation furthered the anti-
dismemberment policies of the Code. 0 7 The commercial lending in-
dustry would be hurt by the Deprizio holding only if lenders -were
customarily taking "pure leverage guarantees." Those taking "true
guarantees" would not be adversely affected. Deprizio, according to
Westbrook, "provide[d] the right incentives and [would] operate to
permit the taking of true guarantees and to discourage the taking of
pure-leverage guarantees, just as we should want."'
08
Westbrook then examined and defended the requirement that
the insider be a creditor of the debtor by virtue of its right to reim-
bursement. He readily admitted that the creditor requirement pre-
sented an anomaly: "the insider's creditor status [while] crucial to the
outcome ... has almost nothing to do with the policies the [Deprizio]
rule serves'0 9 and the [Deprizio] opinion defends."" 0 Recognizing
preference law as formulaic and meant to operate mechanically,
Westbrook found that the creditor requirement served to (1) constrain
the enforcement of preference policy except in the core cases and
(2) include in the "balance against enforcement of preference policy
the costs that would arise from applying the more formulaic prefer-
ence rules to marginal cases.""' In sum, in Westbrook's view, the
105. See id.
106. See id. Since the target of the anti-dismemberment policy was the leverage that the
lender held over a company, the pure-leverage guarantee was in conflict with the Code. Be-
cause the pure-leverage guarantor was unable financially to honor the guarantee, the effect of
Deprizio was to remove the lender's leverage.
107. See id. at 85.
108. Id. at 86.
109. Id. at 88 (citing Cullina, supra note 99, at 151).
110. Id. at 88.
111. Id. at 95. The creditor requirement becomes a proxy for the relationship between the
transfer and the benefit, it reflects the "direct and quantified connection between the company's
transfer and the insider's benefit." Id.
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creditor rule was a proxy for the "policies constraining application of
the preference rules."
112
Peter Alces, in a response to Westbrook's article, rejected this
defense of Deprizio because it removed from its grasp several situa-
tions which should be included within the decision's scope.113 Alces
rejected Westbrook's distinction of a "true guarantee" from a "pure-
leverage guarantee" and his defense of the creditor requirement. 114
Alces found that "[t]he basis of constructive fraud liability [was]
prejudice to the plaintiff, (i.e., general unsecured creditors in bank-
ruptcy) without regard to the intent of the defendant (i.e., preferential
transferee)."1" 5 Alces' position was that Westbrook failed to recognize
the implications of construing "preference law as formulaic."" 6 For
Alces, the Deprizio case was primarily about the constructive fraud
nature of preference law.
Another commentator, David Karzen, commented that even
though the initial transferee would most likely be involved materially
in the aspects of the transaction, § 550(a)(1) on its face did not require
any substantive linkage.117 He argued that when there is no linkage
between the insider and the initial transferee, the initial transferee's
liability under § 550(a)(1) was arbitrary and unfair. Karzen suppor-
ted his position by reference to draft legislation prepared by the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, which he viewed as evidence that
Congress intended that "liability [should] flow from one's substantive
relationship to the avoided transfer.""8
112. Id. at 98.
113. See Peter A. Alces, Rethinking Professor Westbrook's Two Thoughts About Insider
Preferences, 77 MINN. L. REV. 605, 608 (1993).
114. Alces argued that Westbrook's interpretation of the creditor requirement as a "proxy
for the strength and clarity of the relationship between transfer and benefit" misses the central
point of preference law: "the amount of the transfer to the lender would be the amount of the
preference, not the value of the benefit the insider realizes as a result of the preference."
According to Alces there was nothing in the Code to support Westbrook's position. See id. at
631.
115. The very basis of constructive fraud law focuses on the detriment the victim of misrep-
resentation suffers rather than on the benefit the fraud-feasor realizes. See id. at 609.
116. This is, according to Alces, just another terminology for accepting the constructive
fraud nature of preference liability. See id. at 610.
117. See David I. Karzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended Preference
Exposure Via Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils of Initial Transferee Liability, 45 Bus. LAW.
511, 520-23 (1990).
118. Id. at 524. The commission had recommended the separation of the trustee's recovery
rights from the specification of his several avoiding powers. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt.2, at 178 (1973). He also
supports this position based upon the text of § 547(d).
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Unlike legal scholars, practicing attorneys and lenders were
forced to directly confront the practical effects of Deprizio. In the
aftermath of the decision, lenders and their counsel took three differ-
ent courses of action. First, applying a rudimentary cost-benefit
analysis, many lenders sought to ascertain the benefits and burdens
of a personal guarantee more carefully before accepting one. 119 Lend-
ers who had ample leverage by other means often chose another
course, not wanting to risk liability under Deprizio, especially if the
guarantor was not solvent enough to fully cover the loan.120  Also,
many lenders took special care to note that the status of the guaran-
tor often changed over time. A guarantor who had substantial wealth
at the time of the loan might lose some of its assets, thus making the
guarantee less advantageous and more risky for the lender. Simi-
larly, outside guarantors sometimes later became insiders, thereby
making the guarantee less attractive to the lender. In such instances,
many lenders opted to release the guarantor from the guarantee.'
12
Second, some lenders structured their loan transactions so
they were protected as "subsequent transferees" under § 550(a)(2) and
(b). 122 Under this option, the lender would loan money to the insider,
who would then reloan the money to the debtor company. Any pay-
ments would retrace these steps: the debtor company would pay the
insider, who would in turn pay the lender. Even though the debtor's
payments to the insider might be voidable as preferences, the lender
would be insulated as a subsequent transferee who took for value, in
good faith, and without knowledge that the original transfer was
voidable. If allowed, this would shelter all preferential payments,
even those within the ninety-day period.
A number of potential problems, though, presented themselves
in structuring loan arrangements in this manner. First, although the
payments made by the debtor were "to" an insider, a court could con-
strue them as being made "for the benefit" of the lender who ulti-
mately received the money, thus eliminating the subsequent trans-
feree defense through § 550(a). Second, a court could find that the
119. See Karzen, supra note 117, at 511.
120. See id. at 533.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 532. See supra note 18 for text of § 550(a)(2). Section 550(b) provides:
The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a
present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the
voidability of the transfer avoided; or,
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1994).
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lender in such a transaction had not met all the requirements of a
subsequent transferee because of a lack of good faith.123 Finally, a
court could reasonably conclude that the lender had become an in-
sider, through the exercise of its control, subjecting the lender to the
one year preference provision it was attempting to avoid.
To avoid these difficulties, the device most often used by lend-
ers to avoid the Deprizio rule was a waiver. Pursuant to this option,
the insider agreed to waive all rights to reimbursements from the
borrower, or to be subrogated to the lender's rights, after the insider
honored the guarantee. 124 The effect of the waiver was to eliminate
the insider's right to a contingent claim against the debtor, thus ter-
minating its "creditor" status. In this scenario, any payment made to
the lender did not benefit an insider; thus, the extended preference
period was not triggered. This option, however, also presented prob-
lems for the lender. First, guarantors were often reluctant to waive
their reimbursement and subrogation rights because of the increase
in their own risk exposure. Second, the waiver's sole function was to
escape the effect of Deprizio, but the effect was also to intensify the
guarantor's motive to prefer since it would have to answer for the
entire amount if the debtor defaulted.
The viability of the waiver alternative was actually considered
by two bankruptcy courts. 125 The guarantor in In re Fastrans waived
any and all common law, statutory, legal, and equitable rights arising
in relation to the guaranteed indebtedness.1 26 The court reasoned
that for the trustee to utilize Deprizio, "he must establish that the
insider-guarantor.., has a 'claim' against the debtor arising from his
obligations under the Guaranty and is not just a creditor of the debtor
generally."'127 Based on the terms of the waiver, the trustee was un-
able to satisfy that requirement. In re XTI Xonix Tech., Inc. upheld
the effectiveness of obtaining waivers of subrogation, indemnification,
123. The legislative history of § 550(b) seems to allow for a court to make such a finding:
The phrase "good faith" in this paragraph is intended to prevent a transferee from whom
the trustee could recover from transfering [sic] th recoverable property to an innocent
transferee, and receiving a retransfer from him, that is, "washing" the transaction
through an innocent third party. In order for the transferee to be excepted from liability
under this paragraph, he himself must be a good faith transferee.
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 90 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5876.
124. Karzen, supra note 117, at 529. See also Alvin L. Arnold, Bankruptcy: Waiver of
Subrogation Rights Defeats Deprizio, 22 REAL EST. L. REP. 4, 4 (1992).
125. See Hostmann v. First Interstate Bank, N.A. (In re XTI Xonix Tech., Inc.), 156 B.R.
821, 824-34 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993); In re Fastrans, Inc., 142 B.R. 241, 246 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1992).
126. See Fastrans, 142 B.R. at 243.
127. Id. at 245.
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contribution, and reimbursement rights from guarantors in order to
preclude the guarantors' insider creditor status for the purposes of
§§ 547(b) and 550(a).
128
2. Congress's Response: The 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act
Six years after Deprizio, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994.129 Among numerous other provisions, the Reform
Act addressed the perceived inequities of Deprizio and its progeny.
Section 202 of the Reform Act, entitled "Limitation on Liability of
Non-Insider Transferee for Avoided Transfer," overruled the Deprizio
line of cases, inserting a new § 550(c). 130  Section 550 now provides
that noninsider transferees have no liability for preferential transfers
made for the benefit of insiders during the period between ninety days
and one year prior to the filing of bankruptcy petition. The legislative
history confirms this change.' 3' Now, a trustee looking to recover for
a preferential transfer in the Deprizio-type situation will only be able
to look to the insider guarantor for recovery, and not the transferee, if
the transfer was made more than ninety days but less than one year
prior to the petition.
128. XTI Xonix, 156 B.R. at 824; see also In re Southmark Corp., 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.
1993); In re Northwestern Contracting Co., 187 B.R. 420 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995).
129. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
130. See supra note 18 for the language of § 550 prior to the Reform Act. The Reform Act
amended the section as follows:
(c) If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition
(1) is avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and
(2) was made for the benefit of a creditor that at the time of such transfer
was an insider; the trustee may not recover under subsection (a) from a
transferee that is not an insider.
(d) The trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under subsection (a) of this
section.
(e)
(1) A good faith transferee from whom the trustee may recover under
subsection (a) of this section has a lien on the property recovered to
secure the lesser of....
(f) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after the earlier
of-
(1) one year after the avoidance of the transfer on account of which recovery
under this section is sought; or ....
11 U.S.C. § 550 (1994).
131. Section 550(c) "overrules the DePrizio [sic] line of cases and clarifies that non-insider
transferees should not be subject to the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Code beyond
the 90-day statutory period." H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 45 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3353.
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Although the changes in the Reform Act addressed one aspect
of the Deprizio situation, they left unanswered several other potential
questions. For example, there still remains a problem with an "indi-
rect preference" made within ninety days of the petition. Suppose a
fully secured senior lienholder receives a payment from the debtor
within ninety days of the petition. Since the lienholder is fully se-
cured, this transfer would not be avoidable under § 547, since it would
not increase what the creditor would get if she were involved in a
Chapter 7 debtor scenario. But this payment, which lowers the
amount of the lien of the senior lender, necessarily increases the lien
of any junior lienholders. Thus, the payment to the fully secured
senior lienholder is actually "to or for the benefit of' another credi-
tor-the junior lienholder. Accordingly, the Reform Act would still
allow the trustee to recover, under § 550(a)(1), from the fully secured
senior lienholder as "the initial transferee of such transfer."132
Non-insider lenders, under the Reform Act, are now not only
protected from the Deprizio situation, they may actually realize posi-
tive gains from it. 133 Moreover, imagine the effect such a situation is
132. Perhaps more importantly, the Reform Act actually might have gone too far in at-
tempting to protect the so-called "innocent" lender in the Deprizio type situation. Suppose A
Corp. gets a $100,000 loan from Norwest. As a condition of the loan, Norwest requires A Corp.'s
president to personally guarantee the obligation. A Corp. then makes a $60,000 payment to
Norwest. This payment occurs more than ninety days but less than one year prior to A Corp.'s
filing for bankruptcy protection. This transfer has been a benefit to the president, an insider,
because it has lowered his contingent obligation on the guarantee. This transfer can obviously
be avoided as a preferential transfer because it was "to or for the benefit" of a creditor, the
president. Under the Reform Act, the new § 550 then comes into operation. The new section
would not allow the trustee to recover the transfer from the non-insider, Norwest, because the
transfer occurred more than ninety days prior to the bankruptcy petition. The trustee, though,
can recover the payment from the president (assuming she is solvent enough), even though she
did not directly receive the transfer, but only indirectly benefited from it. Norwest, through the
receipt of the $60,000 payment, has now seen its loan decreased to $40,000. Since A Corp. is
now in bankruptcy, Norwest will most likely be an unsecured creditor with respect to this
remaining amount. Even if Norwest were secured, the Trustee could likely avoid any security
interest by operation of § 547(b). See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.0313][a], at 547-28
(1998). If the president was solvent enough to pay the trustee for the avoided preference,
however, the debtor's bankruptcy estate has now grown by $60,000. Presumably, Norwest, as a
creditor, would be able to share in this amount. This obviously puts lenders, such as Norwest in
this example, in a very advantageous position.
An obvious corollary to this is that it may now be less beneficial for lenders to take waivers
of subrogation rights from guarantors. If courts hold that lenders can share in the avoidance
recovery from the insiders, lenders will presumably want the guarantor to be deemed a creditor
so the trustee can look to the guarantor's personal funds to increase the amount of the estate,
without looking to the non-insider lender for recovery.
133. In this scenario, even though Norwest benefits from the insider guarantor's payment
to the trustee, the payment would likely not be a preference as contemplated by the Code, since
the payment actually increases the value of the bankruptcy estate. "[A] preference turns on
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likely to have on future guarantors. Who would agree to act as a "true
guarantor" when they continue to be potentially liable for the debt
even though the creditor is paid?
34
C. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.
In 1987, the BFP partnership was formed to purchase a home
in California from Sheldon and Anne Foreman. 135 BFP acquired title
to realty subject to a first deed of trust in favor of Imperial Federal
Savings & Loan Association in the amount of $356,250.136 BFP
granted a second deed of trust to the Foremans as security for a
$200,000 promissory note. 137 When BFP failed to make the requisite
payments, Imperial instituted foreclosure proceedings. 138 Paul Os-
borne purchased the home at a foreclosure sale on July 12, 1989, for
$433,000.139 On October 12, 1989, BFP filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy relief and initiated an adversary proceeding to set aside the
sale to Osborne as a fraudulent transfer under § 548 of the Code.
140
BFP argued that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance because
the property was actually worth $725,000 at the time of the sale to
Osborne and thus $433,000 was not "reasonably equivalent value.
14'
The bankruptcy court, acting on separate motions, found that
the foreclosure sale was properly conducted under California law
without collusion or fraud. 142 Accordingly, it granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Imperial.143 The district court upheld the bankruptcy
court. 144 BFP sought further review and a divided bankruptcy appel-
whether it results in a diminution of the bankrupt's estate." Danning v. World Airways, Inc. (In
re Holiday Airlines Corp.), 647 F.2d 977, 982 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991).
134. Some other problems that remain after the 1994 Amendment are discussed in David
B. Young & Jeff Bohn, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers: A Lender's Perspective, 767
PLI/CoMM 585, 665-69 (1998).
135. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 533 (1994).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Imperial entered a notice of default and "scheduled a properly noticed foreclosure
sale." Id. Foreclosure proceedings were delayed when Imperial was declared insolvent and
Resolution Trust Corporation was appointed as receiver.
139. See id. at 534.
140. See supra note 20 for the text of § 548. The constructive fraud provision at issue in
BFP permits the avoidance of a transfer if the trustee can establish: (1) there was a transfer of
interest of the debtors; (2) transfer occurred within one year of the filing of bankruptcy petition;
(3) debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or as a result of the transfer; and, (4) debtor
received 'less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer." 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).






late panel affirmed the summary judgment for Imperial. 14 Relying on
In re Madrid,146 the panel majority found that a "non-collusive and
regularly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale... cannot be chal-
lenged as a fraudulent conveyance because consideration received in
such a sale establishes 'reasonably equivalent value' as a matter of
law."'147 BFP appealed both decisions to the Ninth Circuit, which
consolidated the appeals. 48  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
courts' decisions.
49
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision, 50
affirmed the lower courts' decisions and held that a fair and proper
price is the price received at the foreclosure sale. 15' Scalia defined the
question presented in the case as "whether the amount of debt (to the
first and second lienholders) satisfied at the foreclosure sale (viz., a
total of $433,000) is 'reasonably equivalent' to the worth of the real
estate conveyed."'
52
The Court recognized that of the three critical terms ("rea-
sonably," "equivalent," and "value") before it, the Code defined only
"value.1 53 The courts of appeals had employed several distinct ap-
proaches in determining whether a transfer was avoidable for receiv-
ing less than reasonably equivalent value. The Court first examined
the Fifth Circuit's standard as developed in Durrett v. Washington
National Insurance Co. (the "Durrett approach"). 154  To determine
"reasonably equivalent value" under § 548(a)(2), the Durrett approach
applied a numerical test in which the "price" received at the foreclo-
sure sale was gauged against the appraised fair market value. 155 To
defeat a subsequent avoidance in bankruptcy under the Durrett ap-
proach, the foreclosure sale price had to be at least seventy percent of
the fair market value.
56
145. See id. (referencing In re BFP v. Imperial Savings & Loan Assoc., 132 B.R. 748 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1991)).
146. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982).
147. In re BFP v. Imperial Savings & Loan Assoc., 132 B.R. 748, 750 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991).
148. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 534.
149. See In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992).
150. Justice Scalia was joined in the majority by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. Justice Souter, writing for the very spirited
dissent, was joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg.
151. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 545.
152. Id. at 536.
153. Id. at 535. See supra note 34 for the text of the Code defining value.
154. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).




In 1982, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel re-
jected the Durrett approach in In re Madrid (the "Madrid ap-
proach"), 157 holding that a "regularly conducted sale, open to all bid-
ders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private
transfers to relatives and favorites.' 158 The premise of the Madrid
approach was that subjecting a properly conducted foreclosure sale to
attack as fraudulent transfer would create a de facto right of redemp-
tion in the trustee, significantly chilling participation at foreclosure
sales, depressing prices, and increasing deficiency judgments. 159 The
Madrid court held that "consideration received at a non-collusive and
regularly conducted foreclosure sale" meant the same thing as "rea-
sonably equivalent value' under § 548(a)(2)(A). 160 The focus under the
Madrid approach was whether the foreclosure sale conformed with
the governing state law procedures.
The Seventh Circuit adopted the third major approach in its
decision in In re Bundles (the "Bundles approach"). 16' The Seventh
Circuit, dissatisfied with both the Durrett and Madrid approaches,
determined that each bankruptcy court would need to make a case-by-
case determination of reasonable equivalence through a multi-
factored analysis. 62 The reasonable equivalency inquiry would not be
limited to comparing the price received at the foreclosure sale to the
property's fair market value. Rather, it would involve a fact-specific
inquiry requiring the bankruptcy court to utilize its expertise in as-
sessing the adequacy of the price based on the conditions of the
sale.1
63
Scalia rejected the Durrett fixed percentage approach and the
Bundles totality of circumstances approach because of their reliance
on fair market value as the "benchmark" for measuring whether the
price received was "reasonably equivalent."' 64 The Court relied on the
Code's plain language in support of its rejection of these two ap-
proaches. 165 Relying on the canon expressio unius est exclusio alter-
ius, 66 the Court reasoned that because the term "fair market value"
157. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 427 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982).
158. Id. at 426-27.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 427.
161. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
162. See id. at 824.
163. See id. at 825.
164. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1997).
165. See id.
166. The phrase translates to "the expression or inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion
of others."
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does not appear in § 548 but does appear in other sections of the
Code,167 Congress "seemingly [went] out of its way to avoid that stan-
dard term" and instead chose the "entirely novel phrase 'reasonably
equivalent value."' 168  Scalia relied on City of Chicago v. Environ-
mental Defense Fund,169 also decided that same term. There the
Court reasoned that "[i]t is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another."'
170
The Court found further support for its rejection of fair market
value as the "benchmark" by comparing a forced sale with normal
market conditions. According to Scalia, fair market value presumes
conditions that do not apply in the forced sale context.171 In the
Court's view, both Durrett and Bundles failed to "come to grips with
this glaring discrepancy between the factors relevant in an appraisal
of a property's market value, on the one hand, and the strictures of
the foreclosure process on the other."'172 Scalia stated that based on
the factors present at a forced sale the property was "simply worth
less." 73 The Court found fair market value to be the very "antithesis"
of forced sale value, and thus inapplicable in the context of a mort-
gage foreclosure sale.
74
167. For example, "fair market value" does appear in §§ 552 and 346(j)(7)(b).
168. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537.
169. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
170. Id. at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted). In BFP, Scalia went on to note that
"this presumption is even stronger when the omission entails the replacement of standard legal
terminology with a neologism." BFP, 511 U.S. at 537.
171. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537.
172. Id. at 538. Scalia relied for authority on Black's Law Dictionary:
The market value of ... a piece of property is the price which it might be expected to
bring if offered for sale in a fair market; not the price which might be obtained on a sale
at public auction or a sale forced by the necessities of the owner, but such a price as
would be fixed by negotiation and mutual agreement, after ample time to find a pur-
chaser, as between a vendor who is willing (but not compelled) to sell and a purchaser
who desires to buy but is not compelled to take the particular... piece of property.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (6th ed. 1990).
173. BFP, 511 U.S. at 539.
174. Justice Scalia further explained:
An appraiser's reconstruction of "fair market value" could show what similar property
would be worth if it did not have to be sold within the time and manner structures of
state-prescribed foreclosure. But property that must be sold within these strictures is
simply worth less. No one would pay as much to own such property as he would pay to
own real estate that could be sold at leisure and pursuant to normal marketing tech-
niques. And it is no more realistic to ignore that characteristic of the property (the fact
that state foreclosure law permits the mortgagee to sell it at forced sale) than it is to ig-
nore other price-affecting characteristics (such as the fact that state zoning law permits
the owner of the neighboring lot to open a gas station).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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The Court concluded that once a piece of property is subject to
a foreclosure sale, the free market rules are inapplicable and are
replaced by the states' laws governing forced sales. Thus, "the only
legitimate evidence of the property's value at the time it is sold is the
foreclosure-sale price itself."'
17 5
Characterizing the Durrett and Bundles approaches as at-
tempting to establish a "fair" forced sale price, the majority found that
"such judgments represent policy determinations that the Bankruptcy
Code gives us no apparent authority to make. ' 176 The majority rea-
soned that the terms of the sale determine how closely the sale price
at the foreclosure sale approximated its fair market value. Accord-
ingly, since each state determines the terms of a foreclosure sale, "[t]o
specify a federal 'reasonable' foreclosure-sale price is to extend federal
bankruptcy law well beyond the traditional field of fraudulent trans-
fers, into realms of policy where it has not ventured before.'
177
Justice Scalia examined the history of fraudulent transfer and
foreclosure law and noted that until Durrett "no prior decision had
ever applied the 'grossly inadequate price' badge of fraud under
fraudulent transfer law to set aside a foreclosure sale."17 8 The major-
ity rejected the Durrett and Bundles positions that "'reasonably
equivalent value' . . . requires a foreclosure sale to yield a certain
minimum price beyond what state foreclosure law requires.'1 9  In
doing so, the majority recognized Congress's power to disrupt the
"ancient harmony" and to "preempt traditional state law" but noted it
was reluctant to do so "absent clearer textual guidance" in the stat-
ute.180 The majority accordingly held that "a fair and proper price, or
a 'reasonably equivalent value,' for the foreclosed property, is the
price in fact received at the foreclosure sale so long as all the re-
quirements of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with"
because the Code was not clear enough to displace the essential state
175. Id. at 549.
176. Id. at 540.
177. Id. The majority found that "[s]tates have created diverse networks of judicially and
legislatively crafted rules governing the foreclosure process, to achieve what each of them
considers the proper balance between the needs of lenders and borrowers." Id. at 541-42.
178. Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
179. Id. at 542-43. The majority relied on United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993),
for the proposition that "statutes that invade common law must be read with presumption
favoring retention of long-established principles absent evident statutory purpose to the con-
trary." Id. at 543.
180. Id. at 543. The Court rejected the position that the 1984 amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code codified the Durrett approach. According to the Court, the effect of the amend-
ments was to expand the definition of "transfer" to include foreclosure sales and to allow a
transfer to be avoided as fraudulent even if it was against the debtor's will. See id.
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interest. 181 Hence, the price received at a foreclosure sale conclusively
establishes "reasonably equivalent value" for the purposes of §
548(a)(2).18
2
Scalia further asserted that the majority's reading of
§ 548(a)(2) did not render the section superfluous, as the dissent
argued, because "reasonably equivalent value" continued to have an
independent meaning outside the foreclosure context similar to fair
market value. 8 3 According to the majority, this section would con-
tinue to affect those sales that failed to comply with the requisite
state law procedures governing foreclosure sales 8 4 In that instance,
the transfer would be avoided if the "price received was not reasona-
bly equivalent to the property's actual value at the time of the sale."'8 5
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, attacked the majority
for engrafting an exception onto § 548 that was "in derogation of the
straightforward language used by Congress" in drafting the Code. 8 6
Souter argued that the majority opinion attempted to escape the plain
meaning of the Code. The dissent advocated a "plain reading" of § 548
in which the bankruptcy court would "compare the price received by
the insolvent debtor and the worth of the item when sold and set
aside the transfer if the former was substantially ('[un]reasonabl[y]')
'less than' the latter.'1 7 The dissent supported its position through
reliance on the text and policy of the Code.
The dissent vehemently objected to the majority's assumption
that because properties are "worth less" at foreclosure sales they must
be worth whatever price was paid. 88 The dissent found this assump-




185. Id. at 546. ("the price that would have been received if the foreclosure sale had pro-
ceeded according to law"). The majority also noted its disagreement with the dissent's reading
of the plain language of § 548(a)(2). See id. While conceding that the central issue was the
relationship between the value received for the property and the actual value, the majority
rejected the dissent's assertion that there was no ambiguity in the language, asserting that the
doubt lay in "[w]hat . . . foreclosed property [is] worth." Id. at 547 (emphasis omitted). The
majority stated that until the value of the property in foreclosure was determined, there could
not be a determination of whether the price received was reasonably equivalent. See id. The
majority concluded by noting that the dissent failed to offer any alternatives to the question
before the Court, and that it left to bankruptcy courts the determination of "value" and "worth".
Id.
186. Id. at 549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 552.
188. Id. at 551 n.2 (responding to majority at 539). The dissent did recognize that reasona-
bly equivalent value cannot be equated with fair market value because foreclosure sales "fail to
bring in what voluntary sales realize." Id. at 550. The dissent's position was that people pay
less for property at a foreclosure sale not because the property is worth less, but because they
1999] 1273
1274 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 52:1243
tion to be implausible, even accepting the fact that foreclosure sales
bring less value. The dissent offered two primary objections to the
Court's reading of § 548: (1) if "value" of property was conclusively the
price paid at a foreclosure sale, then the "less than equivalent value"
inquiry would never be worth undertaking, and the trustee's avoid-
ance power undoubtedly would be a "dead letter" for mortgage foreclo-
sure sales;189 and (2) the majority opinion allowed for the possibility
that a "peppercorn paid at a non-collusive and procedurally regular
foreclosure sale"'190 can be treated conclusively as "reasonably equiva-
lent value" for the sale of property. The dissent argued that "rea-
sonably equivalent' is a statutory qualification of value that demon-
strates Congressional awareness that assets transferred in a foreclo-
sure sale often receive less than their "optimal value."191 Thus, "rea-
sonably equivalent" embodies acceptance that the assets will not yield
their optimal value and "that avoidance in bankruptcy... should only
occur when it is clear that the bankruptcy estate will be substantially
augmented."'
92
Souter also argued that the majority position violated a basic
rule of construction in giving two separate meanings to the phrase
want a bargain, they want to pay less. Further, in a case like this, there are not an abundance
of "free-spending millionaires" and that those that do exist are not likely reading "the fine print
which fills the 'legal notice' columns of their morning newspaper." Id. at 551 n.2.
189. Id. at 555. The dissent argued that the majority's reading of § 548 resulted in the
section becoming superfluous and a "dead letter." They found additional support for their
assertion based upon the majority noting that the statute would still apply to collusive or
procedurally defective foreclosures and to other types of transfers. According to the dissent,
collusive and procedurally defective sales were already within the ambit of the Code. Id. (citing
In re Worcester, 811 F.2d 1224, 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987) (interpreting § 541(a)). The dissent
stated, "neither the Court nor the respondents and their amici identify any specific case in
which the court pronounced itself powerless to avoid a collusive foreclosure sale." Id. The
dissent continued "[lt would seem peculiar, then, that for no sound reason, Congress would
have tinkered with these closely watched sections of the Bankruptcy Code, for the sole purpose
of endowing bankruptcy courts with authority that had not been found wanting in the first
place." Id. at 555-56 (note omitted).
190. Id. at 549.
191. Id. at 559. The dissent asserted that common sense dictates that a piece of property
has worth independent of forced sale conditions. In addition, the appraised value is relevant to
the reasonable equivalence determination "both because it provides a proper measure of the
rights received by the transferee and because it is indicative of the extent of the debtor's equity
in the property, an asset which, but for the pre-bankruptcy transfer under review, would have
been available to the bankruptcy estate." Id. at 551 n.2. The dissent did not advocate a "dollar
for dollar" exchange or that "fair market value" be expected at a forced sale because the plain
language of § 548 dictates otherwise. Id. at 559.
192. Id. at 559 (citing In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 829-30 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992)
(court must compare "the value of what went out with the value of what came in," but the
equivalence need not be "dollar for dollar") (citation omitted); In re Countdown of Conn., Inc.,
115 B.R. 18 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) ("[S]ome disparity between the value of the collateral and
the value of the debt does not necessarily lead to a finding of lack of reasonably equivalent
value.')).
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"reasonably equivalent value" in § 548(a)(2). 193 "Reasonably equiva-
lent value" takes on a procedural meaning in one class of cases (real
estate foreclosures) and a substantive meaning in another class of
cases (all other transfers or foreclosures).
194
The dissent also relied on the 1984 amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 195 The 1984 amendments included "foreclosure sales"
within the definition of transfer,196 which the dissent found to be clear
textual guidance that Congress intended mortgage foreclosure sales to
be judged under the same standard as other transfers. 197 Thus, the
term "reasonably equivalent value" has a single meaning in the one
provision. According to the dissent, Congress would have never made
foreclosure sales subject to § 548 if it did not want courts to question
the value received at the sale.
98
For the dissent, the plain reading of the Code required bank-
ruptcy courts to compare the price received with the value of the
property at the time of the sale. 99 Regardless of how "difficult and
contestable" this process may be, courts routinely carried out this
procedure when assets were transferred in a non-foreclosure settings.
The dissent asserted that if courts could carry out this process in a
non-foreclosure setting, then they could give "sensible content [to
§ 548] in evaluating particular transfers on foreclosure."20 0  For in-
stance, bankruptcy courts would determine if the price received for
the property at the foreclosure sale was substantially less than the
reasonable value on a case-by-case basis. If so, the sale would be
193. See id. at 557. "A common rule of construction calls for a single definition of a com-
mon term occurring in several places within a statute." Id. (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 283 (1993); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 422 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (" '[N]ormal rule[s] of statutory construction' " require that "identical words [used] in
the same section of the enactment" must be given that same effect.)).
194. Id. at 557 n.9.
195. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353 §§ 401(1),
463(a), 98 Stat. 366, 378 (1984).
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994) ('[I]nvoluntary" transfers are no less within the trus-
tee's § 548 avoidance powers than "voluntary" ones and "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemp-tion" is itself a transfer for the purposes of bankruptcy law).
197. BFP, 511 U.S. at 557. "Thus, whether or not one believes (as the majority seemingly
does not) that foreclosure sales rightfully belong within the historic domain of 'fraudulent
conveyance' law, that is exactly where Congress has now put them, . . . and our duty is to give
effect to these new amendments, along with every other clause of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at
554 (citations omitted).
198. See id. at 555. Further, the amendments demonstrate Congress's intent to regulate
the price received at a foreclosure sale. It is worth noting, as Souter does, that the amendments
specifically rejected codifying In re Madrid, which would have established an irrebuttable
presumption that the price obtained at a foreclosure sale was reasonably equivalent value.
199. See id. at 552.
200. Id. at 560.
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avoided. According to the dissent, the policy of the Code supported
this reading of § 548.201 To obtain the Code's goal-fair balance be-
tween creditors and debtors-a court must be permitted to void "pro-
cedurally regular foreclosure sales for low prices (and thereby return[
] a valuable asset to the bankruptcy estate)."20 2 Souter stated that
this "is plainly consistent with those policies of obtaining a maximum
and equitable distribution for creditors and ensuring a 'fresh start' for
individual debtors, which the Court has often said are at the core of
federal bankruptcy law.
'20 3
The majority had also relied on the federalism canon of Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft20 4 to assert that, based on the state's interest in secu-
rity of titles, the Code must "be presumed to contain an implicit fore-
closure-sale exception, which Congress must override expressly or not
at all.' '205  The dissent argued that the plain language of the Code
rejected a requirement that Congress supply "clearer textual guid-
ance. 20 6  According to the dissent, BFP was distinguishable from
Gregory because the "authority of the States in defining and adjusting
the relations between debtors and creditors has never been plenary,
nor could it fairly be called 'essential to their independence.' ",207 The
dissent argued that the majority had allowed state practice to trump
the federal Bankruptcy Code by allowing each state's practice to de-
termine the value of property.2u8 As the dissent pointed out, the ma-
jority failed to follow the past decisions of the Court which held that
"state regulation must yield to the extent it actually conflicts with
federal law. ' 20 9 Thus, Justice Souter argued, "the Court's opinion...
evinces no special appreciation of the fact that this case arises under
the Bankruptcy Code, which, in maintaining the national system of
credit and commerce, embodies policies distinct from those of state
201. See id. at 562-63.
202. Id. at 563.
203. Id.
204. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). Gregory concerned the state's authority to
determine the qualifications of state officials, i.e., the retirement age of state judges.
205. BFP, 511 U.S. at 565.
206. Id. at 565-66 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (holding that when
the Code is silent or ambiguous it should not be read as departing from previous practice);
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) ('It is not appropriate or
realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took.')).
207. Id. at 565 n.17. Further, the dissent stated that the "Court converts a stray phrase in
[Zeiss] ... into a pronouncement about the allocation of responsibility between the National
Government and the States." Id. (citations omitted).
208. See id. at 567 (relying on Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 648 (1990)).
209. Id. at 567-68 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545, 546 (1992)




debtor-creditor law . . . and which accordingly endows trustees with
avoidance power beyond what state law provides. '210  Further, the
dissent conceded that even if the policy favoring security of title
should count more and the "important!' bankruptcy policies count less,
Congress was the appropriate body to provide a foreclosure-sale ex-
ception.2 n
Thus, Justice Souter found that the meaning of the Code was
"clear," "coherent," and "consistent. '212 Despite the important state
interest involved, the dissent refused to depart from the "plain Code
meaning. 213 According to the dissent, the Court frustrated Congress's
clear intent through its reading of § 548.214 The dissent urged that
effect be given to the statute that Congress wrote authorizing the
trustee to avoid transfers, including foreclosure sales, for less than
the reasonably equivalent value.
215
In their foreword to the Harvard Law Review, William Esk-
ridge and Philip Frickey label BFP a "clumsy move" on behalf of the
Court.21 6 BFP radically expanded Gregory into the majority opinion in
what they argue is "an approach at odds with the Constitution's Su-
premacy Clause.."217  They find Justice Scalia's opinion lacking in
judicial candor 218 because of the "unsupportable formalist gloss" it
gives to "its policy-driven result. ' 219 The country, they assert, will feel
the impact of BFP through the doubt it creates over the meaning of
the Code, because it leaves unanswered when and how the text of the
Code will be overridden because of state interests or any other policy.
210. Id. at 563 n.15 (citations omitted). Souter stated, "a central premise of the bankruptcy
avoidance powers is that what [sic] state law plainly allows as acceptable or 'fair,' as between a
debtor and a particular creditor, may be set aside because of its impact on other creditors ur on
the debtor's chances for a fresh start." Id. at 564.
211. Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
212. Id. at 566. Further the dissent goes on to say "[e]ven if the plain language is insuffi-
ciently 'clear guidance' for the Court, further guidance is at hand here. The provision at hand
was amended in the face of judicial decisions driven by the same policy concerns that animate
the Court, to make plain that foreclosure sales and other 'involuntary' transfers are within the
sweep of avoidance powers." Id. at 566 n.18.
213. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
214. See id.
215. Id. at 570.
216. See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium (The
Supreme Court, 1993 Term), 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 83 (1994).
217. Id. at 84 (citation and footnote omitted). The authors noted that Gregory involved
federal regulation of state governments themselves, which is strikingly different from federal
regulation interfering with state property law. Further they question that the Court failed to
mention Gregory in either Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), or Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997 (1994), both cases involving direct regulation by the federal government.




As they also maintain, BFP presents a problem for the Court because
it produces "stealth constitutionalism"-created through the Court's
use of clear statement rules to promote its own chosen "underenforced
constitutional norms. ' 220 Noting that Scalia's opinion failed to analyze
any constitutional concerns, Eskridge and Frickey label the case as a
"bait and switch. ' 221 Namely, the Court entices Congress to act a
certain way and then it switches the rules. Eskridge and Frickey
charge that instead of making law a "more predictable regime," BFP
leaves the Code's interpretation less predictable than before.
222
More practically, it is unclear whether BFP will apply to fore-
closure bids made by mortgagees since the decision was made in the
context of a third-party purchaser.22 3 When a mortgagee bids on its
own collateral, the majority position loses much of its persuasive
force. As the dissent pointed out, it is in the mortgagee's interest to
only bid the amount of the indebtedness. If the mortgagee bids more,
it is turned over to the debtor or other creditors, but when the mort-
gagee bids the price of the indebtedness and then turns around and
sells the real estate at a profit, it pockets the difference. Prior to BFP,
some courts only applied the Madrid conclusive presumption ap-
proach when there was a successful third-party purchaser. Thus,
based on these factors, courts may find the Supreme Court's free
market approach untenable. 224 Based on the Supreme Court's reli-
ance on a state's legitimate interest in protecting the titles of real
estate, however, the success of this position is unlikely.225 The impact
of BFP on the debtor and junior lienholder will be to move their chal-
lenge from the sale price to the foreclosure sale procedure under state
law.226 Thus, it becomes imperative that both the lender and the
bankruptcy trustee know the applicable state foreclosure law grounds
220. Id. at 85. 'The Court can enforce its own constitutional values without directly
confronting Congress when it requires a clear statement from Congress when their "statutes
venture close to-but not beyond-a constitutional periphery." Id.
221. Id. ("[W]hen Congress enacted the statutes in question [referring to BFP and Gregory],
the constitutionality of the state-infringing provisions was clear and Congress could not have
anticipated the Gregory rule; nor could a reasonable observer have predicted the expansion of
Gregory in BFP.").
222. See id. at 86.
223. See generally Audy M. Perry, Jr., Comment, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation:
Supreme Court Shifts Focus Onto State Law in Ruling on Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 97 W. VA.
L. REV. 255 (1994).
224. See Kenneth M. Block & Jeffrey B. Steiner, Ending the Threat of 'Durrett": BFP
Settles Application of Fraudulent Transfer to Foreclosures, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1994, at 5.
225. See id. at 6.
226. See Barr v. Allen, 170 B.R. 772, 776 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting the only issue for
the court was "whether the foreclosure sale sub judice was accordant procedurally and substan-
tively with applicable South Carolina state foreclosure law").
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for attacking involuntary transfers, including irregular foreclosure
procedures, inadequate price, and collusion.
The Supreme Court's decision in BFP may also affect fraudu-
lent conveyance claims in relation to other involuntary judgments. In
the real estate tax sales context, the courts have divided over the
applicability of BFP. Some courts have distinguished BFP based on a
footnote in the opinion limiting the decision to cover "mortgage fore-
closure of real estate" and noting that "considerations bearing upon
other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example)
may be different. ' 227 But other courts have followed BFP under the
rationale that a tax sale is "as much a forced sale process as a mort-
gage foreclosure. ' 228 Although BFP operates to make inadequate price
irrelevant for determining "reasonably equivalent value" under the
Code, it may still be a valid ground for setting aside a sale under state
foreclosure law. In Barr v. Allen, the bankruptcy court upheld a sale
after analyzing the sale price under the state's substantive foreclosure
law to determine if the price was so low as to shock the conscience or
raise a presumption of fraud or unfairness. 229 Since the Court's deci-
sion, BFP has been extended to apply to both state land sale contract
forfeitures 230 and unauthorized post-petition tax foreclosure sales,
23'
but not personal property forfeitures or forced sales of personal prop-
erty.
232
BFP and Deprizio illustrate the use of formalist methods by
two leading judges. As Judge Easterbrook's use of formalism in the
227. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 n.3 (1994); see D'Alfonso v. A.R.E.I.
Inv. Corp. (In re D'Alfonso), 211 B.R. 508, 517-18 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); Jones v. C&M Invs. (In
re Jones), 209 B.R. 380, 386 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). See generally Butler v. Lejcar (In re
Butler), 171 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
228. McGrath v. Simon, 170 B.R. 78, 82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994); see also In re Samaniego, 224
B.R. 154 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1998); Russell-Polk v. Bradley (In re Russell-Polk), 200 B.R. 218
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996). But BFP may not apply to "tax foreclosure" sales. In re Sherman, 223
B.R. 555, 558 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998).
229. See Barr, 170 B.R. at 776-77.
230. See Vermillion v. Scarbrough, 176 B.R. 563, 569-70 (Bankr. D. Or. 1994) (court found
that BFP had equal relevance in the context of Oregon land sale contract forfeitures where
debtor in possession sought recovery); see also McCanna v. Burke, 197 B.R. 333 (D.N.M. 1996).
But see Dunbar v. Johnson (In re Grady), 202 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding
BFP does not apply to land sale contract forfeiture).
231. See T.F. Stone Co. v. Harper, 170 B.R. 884, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994), affid, 72 F.3d
466 (5th Cir. 1995) ('The Supreme Court's rational to protect bona fide purchasers appears to be
no less applicable to a § 540 transfer in a non-collusive tax foreclosure sale as it is in a § 548
transfer by way of a mortgage foreclosure sale.'). But see Shaw v. County of San Bernadino, 157
B.R. 151 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993).
232. See Carter v. H&B Jewelry & Loan (In re Carter), 209 B.R. 732, 735-37 (Bankr. D. Or.
1997) (refusing to extend BFP rationale to a case where debtor forfeited property to a pawn
shop); see also In re Prince Gardner, Inc., 220 B.R. 63 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1998).
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context of Deprizio indicates, judges can seldom rely on formalism or
interpositive methodology alone. Indeed, in Deprizio, as we noted,
Judge Easterbrook employed an approach which considered both the
legislative history and purpose of the relevant statutory section.
Justice Scalia's use of the history of bankruptcy and state mortgage
laws, along with what commentators have concluded are his hidden
policy considerations in BFP, buttress this point. The remainder of
this Article will show how the disciplines of cognitive psychology and
fuzzy logic illuminate the reasoning processes used by formalists and
antiformalists while also demonstrating how these models of judicial
decision making might inform efforts to improve statutory interpre-
tation of complex statutes.
II. A FORMAIST'S GUIDE TO PRACTICAL REASONING AND Fuzzy LOGIC
In Part I, we provided a "thick description" of formalist rea-
soning in action. The stereotypical formalist judge decides cases in a
matter of minutes, aided only by a dictionary and a list of canons of
interpretation. If Part I does nothing else, it should demonstrate that
formalist methods are far more complex in practice. In Part II, we
explore the kinds of judicial reasoning that formalists use just as
much as other judges. In the first section, we show that formalist
judges cannot avoid reliance on expert judgment when applying their
methods. The next two sections attempt to explore in greater depth
what is involved in the application of expert judgment. We consider
cognitive psychologists' research on expert decisionmaking, then turn
to the use of fuzzy logic to model expert decisionmaking in the legal
context, by developing such a model for the Deprizio decision.
A. "Judgment Calls" and the Formalist Judge
Justice Scalia's opinion in BFP provides a useful insight into
formalist methods. The majority in BFP interpreted "reasonably
equivalent value" in § 548 to mean whatever price was received at a
regularly conducted foreclosure sale, and not, as urged by the parties
and the dissent, "fair market value" or a "fair and proper price. '233 It
rejected "fair market value" based on an expressio unius est exclusio
233. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994).
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alterius argument.234 Likewise, it rejected a "fair and proper price"
interpretation because of a lack of congressional intent and the his-
tory of fraudulent transfer law and foreclosure law.235 The majority
found an essential state interest in the security of title to real es-
tate-a core state function, which can only be disrupted by Congress
with a clear statement of intent. Absent such clear, contrary congres-
sional intent, and based upon the conditions at a foreclosure sale, the
Court found that free market rules were inapplicable. The Court
instead replaced the free market rules with a state's laws governing
forced sales, which ultimately become the only tool for measuring
value.236
To deride this approach as mindless literalism would be a
mistake. On the contrary, Justice Scalia's approach extends beyond
(and perhaps even "against") the dictionary meaning of the phrase in
dispute to include a fairly rich array of other factors. Indeed, apart
from his steadfast refusal to consider legislative debates and commit-
tee reports-a position in which he is now apparently almost alone on
the Court-his approach seems to contain nearly the full range of
considerations that might be thought relevant.
237
Judge Easterbrook's approach in Deprizio provides another
illustration of formalist methods.238 Easterbrook relied upon the
unambiguous language of §§ 547 and 550(a). Mandating an "ordi-
nary" reading, the Seventh Circuit found that the debtor engaged in
preferential transfers and allowed the trustee to recover from the
initial transferees, the lenders. 239 The Seventh Circuit relied upon the
plain language of the Code in rejecting both the equitable arguments
and the "two-transfer" theory that the lower courts advocated. 240
Easterbrook also found support from the purpose of the Code in main-
taining bankruptcy as a collective proceeding for the determination
234. Id. at 537. Since the term is used elsewhere in the Code, and it is presumed Congress
acts intentionally, Congress must have meant something else by its use of "reasonably equiva-
lent value" in the fraudulent conveyance context.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 537, 545.
237. On the evolution of textualist analysis beyond literalist application of dictionaries, see
Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997
WISC. L. REV. 235, 236-40. A recent empirical study of Supreme Court statutory interpretation
decisions confirms that the Court relies on a wide range of legal sources, including judicially
created policy norms. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in
Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretations, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18, 21-28 (1998).
238. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
239. Id. at 1197.
240. Id. at 1195-99.
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and payment of debts. 241 In allowing recovery from the initial trans-
feree under § 550(a), Easterbrook rejected the "barking dog" technique
advocated by the lenders.2 42 Instead, he found that a silent legislative
history did not allow a court to depart from the clear and unambigu-
ous text of the Code.
243
A central question at this point is whether formalist judges
like Scalia and Easterbrook even need practical reason. The answer
is a resounding "yes." Perhaps the need for practical reason is most
obvious in connection with the canons that formalist judges use. As
Llewellyn demonstrated, the traditional canons can be readily ar-
ranged in conflicting pairs.244 Typically, the two canons in a given
pair are not directly contradictory, but instead their domains are
defined by qualifications such as "unless the context dictates other-
wise." Application of these conflicting canons may require a good deal
of skilled judgment. Moreover, the statutory language in any given
case may trigger more than one canon. For example, different gram-
matical features of the text may evoke conflicting canons, or a text-
based canon may cut against a policy-based canon like the rule of
linguistic lenity.
245
The possibility of such conflicts cannot be eliminated without
drastic surgery on the body of canons. As Cass Sunstein points out,
"[t]he only way to reduce the risk of conflicting interpretive principles
is to produce a system with one or very few such principles" but any
such "simple system will contain an unacceptably high potential for
an unacceptably large number of errors. ' 246 Given the traditional set
of canons, which Scalia endorses, statutory interpretation must some-
times involve conflicting canons and therefore the need to exercise
judgment.
Even eliminating the canons in favor of pure textualism would
not reduce statutory interpretation to a mechanical task. Modern
courts often confront statutes that are lengthy and complex. Deciding
what interpretation of a particular clause best fits the overall text of
the Internal Revenue Code, the Clean Air Act, or the Uniform Com-
241. See id. at 1197.
242. Id. at 1195-96.
243. See id. at 1196.
244. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 401-06 (1960);
see also Ronald F. Wright, Letters from Beyond the Regulatory State, 100 YALE L.J. 825, 839-40
(1990) (book review).
245. Moreover, as Nicholas Zeppos points out, the "plain meaning' of two provisions may
conflict. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1627 (1991).
246. Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1990).
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mercial Code is a demanding process. 247 The judge must determine
which conflicting interpretation has the best coherence with the over-
all sense of the statute. This determination obviously requires a good
deal of judgment, not to mention expertise.248 Justice Scalia's textu-
alism is ultimately based on his desire to cabin judicial discretion in
order to avoid reliance on the "judge's own views of justice, fairness,
or social welfare. '249 If the issue, however, is not the dictionary
meaning of a particular clause, but the interpretation that produces
the best "fit!' with a complex statute, the judge's decision must seem-
ingly retain an element of discretionary judgment.
Judges could avoid these difficulties by resorting to clause-
bound plain meaning. Under that approach, the judge would first
determine the clause of the statute that controls the dispute. She
then would pick the meaning that would be most likely adopted by an
English speaker who knew nothing about the purpose of the statute,
surrounding provisions of the statute, the statute's history, other
aspects of the legal context, or American social and cultural norms.
The reasons for eschewing that approach, however, are sufficiently
obvious to deprive it of any support among writers on jurisprudence,
let alone practicing judges. Any method of interpretation sufficiently
complex to be seriously considered sometimes will require the use of
practical reasoning. Thus, no plausible system of interpretation truly
can be distilled to noncontroversial deductions from a set of rules.
Indeed, even the most rigorous formalism could not eliminate
the need for practical reasoning by appellate judges. As Llewellyn
pointed out, parties are unlikely to appeal clear-cut cases. 250  For
instance, once a strong presumption in favor of ordinary meaning is in
place, the cases most likely to reach appellate courts are those that
remain debatable even given the presumption, either because the
ordinary meaning seems ambiguous or because the countervailing
considerations are unusually strong. In those cases, operating at the
margin of the domain of ordinary meaning, the appellate judge must
exercise judgment about whether the totality of other relevant princi-
ples overcome ordinary meaning. In short, as H.L.A. Hart recognized,
247. The search for "horizontal" coherence within a statute is an important part of Justice
Scalia's method. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621,
660-63 (1990). For an insightful discussion of statutory interpretation in tax law, see Michael
Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax
Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991).
248. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 247, at 826-31.
249. Zeppos, supra note 245, at 1619 (footnote omitted).
250. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 244, at 398.
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any system of rules will inevitably require the exercise of "discretion"
in hard cases, 251 and any plausible vision of formalism must acknowl-
edge that reality. Formalism might plausibly attempt to diminish the
number of hard cases or their practical significance, but not to elimi-
nate them.
B. Analyzing Legal Problems: Practical Reasoning
and Expert Judgment
While formalists have focused on the structure of rules that
judges use, their primary intellectual opponents have focused on the
interaction between rules and the concrete cases confronting judges.
Tending to downplay the importance of rules, they focus on the "prac-
tical reason!' that judges use when applying law to a particular case.
Frank Michelman has observed that practical reasoning
"seems always to involve a combination of something general with
something specific," so that judgment "mediates between the general
standard and the specific case. ' 252 In applying a standard, we must
interpret it, thereby reconstructing "the standard's meaning and
rightness.'253 Michelman also notes that "[t]his process, in which the
meaning of the rule emerges, develops, and changes in the course of
applying it to cases is one that every common law practitioner will
immediately recognize. '254 Practical reason, then, is a search for
contextual justification for the best legal answer among the potential
alternatives. 255 Or, to use an image common in discussions of prac-
tical reasoning, justification is thought to be more of a web than a
tower, drawing on the coherence of many sources rather than building
on a single unified foundation.
Advocates of practical reasoning have attempted to explain the
methods that they believe judges (and particularly the best judges)
25 6
251. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (1961). This discussion should not be read
to imply that practical reasoning is absent from the decision of easy cases. It is an open ques-
tion whether hard cases trigger additional cognitive skills, or whether instead easy cases merely
involve very simple applications of the same cognitive skills involved in deciding hard cases.
252. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government (Supreme Court Term
1985), 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1986); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Colloquy: The Degradation of
Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 252-53 (1992).
253. Michelman, supra note 252, at 28.
254. Id. at 28-29.
255. See John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 349 (1986).
256. Justice Cardozo's own description of the decisional process comes to mind in this
regard. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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use to decide hard cases. Those efforts are often attacked as banal
257
or vacuous, 258 and admittedly are much less precise than one might
wish. On the other hand, many other cognitive skills also are ex-
tremely difficult to explain (for example, the ability to determine the
correct swing path for hitting a golf ball) yet these skills obviously
exist. Given our general ignorance of the functioning of the human
brain, it is not surprising that we cannot give a convincingly detailed
account of how a difficult task, such as deciding a hard case, is ac-
complished.
The vagueness of these descriptions of practical reasoning has
given ammunition to critics who find it a vacuous concept. However,
there seems to be no escape from the need to make judgments in
situations where various rules and canons collide or contain ambigui-
ties and gaps. Formalists may regret rather than celebrate the need
for judges to make 'judgment calls," but they cannot escape the neces-
sity of practical reasoning. It behooves us, then, to attempt to clarify
as much as possible the nature of the cognitive processes involved.
Although only a limited amount of work has been done re-
garding legal decisionmaking, 259 a broader body of literature has
examined how experts in various other fields make decisions. The
study of expertise has been a fruitful field of study for psychologists
over the past twenty years. Some of this interest grows out of the
field of Artificial Intelligence ("Al"), motivated by a desire to design
computer systems that can mimic the decisions of human experts.
260
One of the first efforts toward AI was through the game of
chess. For this reason, chess expertise has been the subject of consid-
erable study. The basic strategy for building a chess-playing com-
puter is to project the play forward as many moves as possible, con-
257. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 149 (1990).
258. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 452 (1990) (critiquing Farber
and Frickey).
259. See generally Jeanette A. Lawrence, Expertise on the Bench: Modeling Magistrates'
Judicial Decision-Making, in THE NATURE OF ExPERTISE 229-60 (Michelene T.H. Chi et al., eds.,
1988); Anthony Palasota, Expertise and the Law: Some Recent Findings From the Cognitive
Sciences About Complex Human Information Processing, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 599 (1991);
Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal Reason-
ing, 99 YALE L.J. 1957 (1990). For a recent review of the literature, see Ian Weinstein, Lawyer-
ing in the State of Nature: Instinct and Automaticity in Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1
(1998).
260. Perhaps it is not unfair to note that this project is in some sense the epitome of
formalism, literally trying to reduce a decisionmaking process to the mechanical application of
rules. The ideal formalist judge would be a well-programmed computer. As we suggest at the
end of this Article, the most plausible model of judicial decisionmaking involves "fuzzy" rules.
In principle, a suitably designed computer would conceivably follow these rules.
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sidering variables such as each possible move, the opponent's possible
responses, and the computer's best counter-responses. The initial
assumption was that chess masters differed from novices by their
ability to see more moves ahead in the game. As it turned out, how-
ever, chess masters do not typically look farther ahead in the game; if
they did, they would be unable to perform such feats as 'lightning
chess" against multiple opponents. Instead, they differ from novices
in another respect, which a classic series of experiments revealed.
261
In these experiments, the subjects were briefly shown a slide of
a chess board and afterwards asked to recall the positions of the
thirty-six game pieces. Novices were lucky to be able to remember the
positions of five or six pieces after seeing a board for five seconds.
Chess masters were able to reconstruct the positions of twenty pieces,
and were also much better at retaining this knowledge after interrup-
tions. But in other areas, chess masters have no better than average
memories.
262
The most intriguing finding was that chess masters did not
have a particularly good recall for the positions of individual pieces.
263
Rather, their advantage was limited to those positions that might
result from real games. For example, when chess pieces were ran-
domly placed on the board, the chess masters did little better than the
novices. Moreover, when recalling real chess positions, chess masters
did not place the pieces on the board on an individual basis but in
clusters of strategically meaningful groups, like pawn chains.
264
Based on experiments of this sort, researchers concluded that chess
masters have learned something on the order of fifty thousand differ-
ent chess patterns, along with typical tactics associated with each
position. Thus, chess masters normally do not have to reason labori-
ously. about which piece to move and how their opponent may re-
spond, because they immediately "see" the next move. In short, the
experts "chunk" the information into meaningful units-they recog-
nize patterns and associate those patterns with potential strategies.
26 5
Other studies of expertise confirm the crucial importance of
this type of sophisticated pattern recognition. In a study of how ex-
perts and novices solve physics problems, researchers found that
experts actually took longer to categorize the problems than the nov-
261. For a description of these classic experiments, see JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 243-45 (2d ed. 1985).






ices.2 66 The novices tended to classify on the basis of superficial fea-
tures ("this involves an inclined plane"), while the experts looked for
deeper principles ("this involves energy conservation"). Once they had
classified the problem, however, the experts proceeded much more
directly, quickly, and accurately to the solution.267 Their mental cate-
gories also were connected directly with solution methods, which
experts could readily call up once they had classified the problem.268
Although these studies primarily have involved experts in fields
where spatial and visual information is important, like architecture
and athletics, they clearly demonstrate the requisite expert's ability
"to detect and remember patterns in complex sets of phenomena that
are essentially invisible to novices."269
A particularly relevant study involved expert radiologists.
Like physicists, expert radiologists spent more time interpreting
X-rays than novices in their preliminary assessment of how to catego-
rize the problem situation.270 After they made this categorization, the
experts moved rapidly to solutions. 271 Their categorization tended to
be much more accurate and to provide more coherent explanations. 272
Notably, experts were more willing than novices to discard their pre-
liminary assessment in the light of new information (or newly noticed
features of the X-ray.)
273
This study seems especially relevant based upon the apparent
similarity between medical diagnosis and legal reasoning.27 4 Despite
the expectation that physicians would rely on their understanding of
the basic sciences and the application of the scientific method in
making diagnoses, the studies in fact demonstrated the opposite. 27
Expert physicians rely more heavily on their experience in examining
266. See id.
267. See Michelene T.H. Chi et. al., Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems
by Experts and Novices, 5 COGNITIVE SC. 121, 134 (1981).
268. See id. at 139.
269. Id. at 141.
270. Alan Lesgold et al., Expertise in a Complex Skill: Diagnosing X-ray Pictures, in THE




274. See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2262-67 (1989) (explaining the use of cognitive
models in legal reasoning and the relationship with Llewellyn's "situation sense). Reasoning
by analogy, which is important in law, has also been the subject of recent research, as seen in
Laura R. Novick & Keith J. Holyoak, Mathematical Problem Solving by Analogy, 17 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 398 (1991), and Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
275. See Chi, supra note 267, at 134.
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and treating patients than on their biomedical knowledge of the un-
derlying disease process. 2 6 Apparently, practicing physicians make
"virtually no use of basic science knowledge.
'277
Admittedly, the study of expertise by psychologists is relatively
primitive, and further research may unseat current psychological
dogma. Moreover, legal expertise may require some skills different
than those involved in the areas that have been studied most inten-
sively.27 8 Nevertheless, these results suggest some possible insights
about how legal experts may learn to make decisions.
If neither psychologists nor the experts themselves can give a
detailed account of the ability to make expert decisions, how is it
possible for experts to acquire the skill? Typically, experts acquire
skill by following examples 279 and through practice, with large doses
of the latter. Herbert Simon estimated that chess masters have spent
ten to twenty thousand hours staring at chess positions, the equiva-
lent of full-time study for ten academic years on a single subject.
2 80
Similarly, a radiologist's knowledge may be based upon the examina-
tions of ten thousand to two hundred thousand films. 28' The founda-
tion of expertise, like that of the law, seems to be experience more
than logic.
Moreover, these studies reveal expertise to be more than an act
of intuitive perception. Expert radiologists did not merely perceive x-
rays more accurately, they gave better reasons for their inter-
pretations and were better able to test them against additional infor-
mation.28 2 Similarly, the exercise of practical reasoning by judges is
not a mystical intuitive act, but an effort to understand and reason
through a problem, which is subject to criticism and assessment by
legal observers.
In sum, this body of literature provides three major conclu-
sions about how experts make decisions. 283 First, expertise does not
simply consist of knowing a greater number of facts or rules. It also
involves the crucial ability to pick out the key features of a new situa-
tion. Second, this skill is learned primarily through experience with
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. But a recent empirical study indicates that experienced lawyers indeed utilize many of
the same methods as other experts. See Weinstein, supra note 259, at 24-40.
279. In this case, from the problems that others solve.
280. See THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE, supra note 259, at xxxi.
281. See Lesgold, supra note 270, at 312.
282. See id. at 310-13, 320-23.
283. For a more detailed discussion, see Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical
Reason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 534-38 (1992).
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large numbers of past situations. 4 Third, expertise is not merely an
act of intuitive perception. As noted above, expert radiologists do not
merely perceive x-rays more accurately than novices; they give better
reasons for their interpretations and are better able to test those
interpretations against additional information.
28 5
Assuming these findings carry over to law, we would expect
judicial decision-making to have several characteristics. First, re-
gardless of the judge's favored methodology, use of that methodology
will involve the use of pattern analysis. Second, the judge's pattern
analysis will identify and categorize the salient facts and link those
facts with relevant legal interpretations. Third, the judge's ability to
conduct this pattern analysis is at least as much a function of experi-
ence and training as of raw ability or knowledge of legal theories.
Formalist and antiformalist judges alike must engage in this type of
pattern analysis before they can apply their favored legal methods to
the cases before them.
C. Applying Legal Rules: Fuzzy Logic and Its Applications
Consider the task facing a formalist judge when confronting a
new case. First, the judge must take a relatively unformed legal
problem and translate it into formalist terms. For example, the judge
must decide what statutory text is most relevant (which usually
means an overall understanding of the operation of the statute) and
284. Consider the following analysis of the nature of expertise:
The expert spends proportionally more time building up a basic representation of
the problem situation before searching for a solution .... The novice takes much longer
but devotes a small proportion of his total processing time to finding/generating an ini-
tial problem representation. In some domains, even the absolute time spent on building
the right initial representation is longer for experts.
A schema with a high probability of being at least in the right problem space is in-
voked very rapidly by the expert. This schema guides further processing, including the
building of a basic representation.
Experts are able to tune their schemata to the specifics of the case. This permits
them to test more completely whether the schema they have invoked is in fact the right
one.
Lesgold, supra note 270, at 312. This description is strikingly similar to Steve Winter's account
of the everyday use of experience-based cognitive templates by nonexperts. See Winter, supra
note 274, at 2225.
285. As the radiology example indicates, belief in practical reasoning does not imply
skepticism about reality. Knowing, for example, that radiologists use practical reasoning rather
than formalist methods provides no reason to doubt the reality of the cancers they diagnose.
Nor does practical reasoning suggest any reason to embrace value relativism. On the contrary,
practical reasoning suggests that our ordinary moral judgments are defensible rather than
merely arbitrary. Finally, contrary to a view that advocates of storytelling sometimes express,
practical reasoning is a form of rational decisionmaking, not an alternative to rationality.
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what canons of interpretation apply to the case. As the previous
section demonstrated, cognitive psychologists have studied the kinds
of pattern analysis involved in this kind of expert judgment. Second,
we have already seen that in any case interesting enough to reach an
appellate court, multiple factors will bear on the result. For example,
relevant language in more than one clause may need to be reconciled
or several canons of interpretation arguably may apply. Moreover,
these factors themselves are not bivalent. The meaning of a particu-
lar clause is rarely perfectly clear, and a canon of interpretation may
apply with more or less strength in a given situation. Somehow, the
formalist judge must combine these factors to reach a decision in the
case. In this section, we will examine how the discipline of fuzzy logic
provides a model for this second phase of the decision-making process.
1. Basic Principles
As almost everyone else, judges usually speak and write in
bivalent terms. An especially rigorous type of this bivalent logic is
used extensively in certain technical fields, including mathematics
and computer science, where it is particularly useful to work with
strings of zeroes and ones and to eliminate fractions. In employing
this type of logic, however, one "trades accuracy for simplicity."286 The
alternative descriptions "my lawn is green" and "my lawn is brown"
are bivalent statements. They describe one's view of the lawn. Yet,
rarely is either precisely accurate-grass is seldom completely green
or completely brown.
Fuzziness, or multivalence, is useful everywhere between these
two extremes. A fuzzy interpretation of the statement "the lawn is
green" takes the statement to be a partial truth.8 7 Fuzziness at-
tempts to capture a more nuanced and precise picture of the world,
not merely a bivalent description of it. Fuzziness does not, however,
reject absolutes-multivalence reduces to bivalence in extreme cases.
Occasionally, a lawn really is purely green or purely brown. Yet,
fuzziness recognizes that this description is rarely accurate. More
often, a lawn is best described as both green and brown or, in fuzzy
terms, as both green and not green. Multivalent logic trades the
"rounded-off simplicity of bivalence" for "the expressive power and
286. Kosko & Isaka, supra note 5, at 21.
287. See id. at 26.
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accuracy of fuzziness. 288 Fuzziness recognizes that every statement,
every word, is a matter of degree.
289
The way that opposing terms blur into each other is familiar to
lawyers. Some legal terms, such as "reasonableness" and "good faith,"
often seem to consist of nothing other than blurry edges. One of the
first lessons of law school, however, is that even seemingly more
discrete terms like "offer," "intent," and "cause" are blurrier than
expected. The same is true of ordinary terms. An hour away from the
office is not a vacation, a month on a beach clearly is one, and in
between are many absences from work that seem somewhat vacation-
like but are not easily classified. To some extent, "vacation" is a mat-
ter of degree; the word stands for a fuzzy set of events rather than one
side of a crisp dichotomy.
"Fuzzy logic," a term used to describe technology employed in
devices from video cameras to washing machines, 290 is nothing more
than reasoning with fuzzy sets. In practice, it most often means
creating devices that apply fuzzy rules: if-then statements like, "If the
clothes are Very Dirty (fuzzy set X), then make the wash cycle Longer
(fuzzy set Y)." In mathematical terms, fuzzy if-then rules express the
relation between fuzzy sets. Each rule, in turn, defines a "fuzzy
patch," the product of fuzzy sets X and Y.2 91 "The wider the fuzzy sets
[X and Y], the wider and more uncertain the fuzzy patch. '292 Moreo-
ver, the fuzzier the fuzzy set, the more the set resembles its own
opposite, and the greater its fuzzy entropy. A set with 0% fuzziness is
a black and white set; a set that equals its own opposite is a 100%
fuzzy set.293 For readers who are unfamiliar with the basics of fuzzy
logic, please refer to the short introduction in Appendix I.
While most complex systems require precise rules in order to
run efficiently and accurately, a fuzzy system does not require a so-
phisticated understanding of the concepts underlying the system.
Fuzzy concepts work just as well. As long as the underlying rules are
sensible, the system will work. Moreover, once the rules are in place,
it is relatively easy to adjust the boundaries of the fuzzy sets in order
288. Id. at 29.
289. See id. at 122.
290. See, e.g., Michael Schrage, Looking Ahead to the Smart House, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
28, 1993, at 84 (reporting that fuzzy logic is used in the computer system of a proposed "smart
home'); Michael White, A Wooly Head for Logic, TIMES MAGAZINE (London), Jan. 22, 1994, at 26
(discussing the uses of fuzzy logic in consumer appliances like camcorders, microwave ovens,
and dishwashers).
291. Kosko & Isaka, supra note 5, at 292.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 291.
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to streamline the system. The need for such changes become appar-
ent through trial and error. For example, in a system designed to
control vehicle braking, if the vehicle is braking too early, one would
change the parameters of the fuzzy sets to allow for a shorter distance
to the obstacle before braking.
Most fuzzy reasoning techniques fall into two categories: direct
and indirect. Direct methods, like that of the braking example, are
the most popular and use inference rules as a basis.294 When multiple
premises are used, not just a simple "if X then Y" relationship, the
determination of the consequence becomes more complex. The most
popular direct method for handling multiple input problems is the
Mamdani method. This method is structured around minimum and
maximum operations.
295
Mamdani's direct method for fuzzy reasoning may be readily
applied to the fraud issue that the Court in BFP addressed.296 In
BFP, the Court struggled to resolve the fourth element of the con-
structive fraud definition in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code: "that the
debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value in the ex-
change for such transfer. '297 Fuzzy reasoning can help to determine if
a constructive or even an actual fraudulent transfer exists in the
context of a foreclosure sale. In the example that follows, two vari-
ables [A, B] constitute the premise and one variable constitutes the
consequence [C]. The two premise variables account for the time
between notice and sale [A] and the perceived value received from the
sale [B]. This simple two input model does not rely solely on the
interpretation of "reasonably equivalent value." Instead, the model
incorporates rational economic criteria based on a time-to-market
equilibrium concept. Basically, a forced-sale occurs either "quickly" or
"slowly." Many variables may enter the determination of what consti-
tutes "quick" or "slow," such as the extent and timing of notice, avail-
ability of bidding instructions, and whether the sale is private or
public.298 However, for introductory purposes, the following example
is limited to the aforementioned two input variables. The fuzzy rules
are as follows:
294. See KAZUO TANAKA, AN INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY LOGIC FOR PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
81 (1997).
295. See id. at 82.
296. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
297. Id. at 535.
298. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Wasted Days and Wasted Nights: Why the Land Acts
Failed, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1037, 1059 (1996); Ronald Benton Brown et al., Property Law: 1995
Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV. 257, 276 (1995).
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Rule 1: IF sale is slow [Al]
AND price is low [Bi]
THEN do not suspect fraud [Cl] ("low" is correct here)
Rule 2: IF sale is slow [Al]
AND price is high [B2]
THEN suspect fraud on the buyer [C2] (waiting for the
"pigeon")
Rule 3: IF sale is fast [A2]
AND price is low [Bi]
THEN suspect fraud on the seller [C3] (perhaps limited
notice)
Rule 4: IF sale is fast [A2]
AND price is high [B2]
THEN do not suspect fraud [Cl]
Rules 1 through 4 can be represented as a rule table shown in Illus-
tration 1.




These "ordinary word" rules must then be translated into fuzzy sets.
The fuzzy sets representing these ordinary word rules can be ex-
pressed as membership functions as shown in Illustrations 2 through
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Illustration 4: Membership Function for Suspicion of Fraud
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Degree of Suspicion of Fraud
To implement the fuzzy reasoning process, it is necessary to
introduce a concept know as rule adaptability.299 To illustrate the
adaptability concept, let x represent the fuzzy set A, y represent the
299. See TANAKA, supra note 294, at 86.
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fuzzy set B, and z represent the fuzzy set C. If x. and y. are the in-
puts then,
Adaptability of Rule 1: w1 = Ai(Xo) A B(Yo)
Adaptability of Rule 2: w2 = AI(Xo) A B2(Yo)
Adaptability of Rule 3: w3 = A2(Xo) A B(Yo)
Adaptability of Rule 4: w4 = A2(xo) A B2(Yo)
where "A ," the logic symbol for "and," is a minimization operation.
Next, the adaptability of each rule is applied to the conse-
quence and a final solution is sought by aggregating the individual
conclusions.
Final conclusion c(z) = ci(Z) v c2(Z) v c3(z)
where "v ," the logic symbol for "or," is an aggregation operation.
The reasoning process is illustrated in Illustration 5. To begin
the process, input values for x0 and yo are chosen: 12 days and a per-
ceived 65% of fair market value, respectively. Next, these inputs are
entered into the rules. Once entered, the adaptability concept is used
to determine the output. After the output has been determined for
Rules 1 through 4, the consequences are aggregated to yield a final
conclusion: slight degree of suspicion of fraud on the seller.
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Illustration 5: Reasoning Process
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Slight Suspicion of Fraud on Seller
To convert the output to a definite value, a "defuzzification"
operation is needed. The "center of gravity" or "centroid averaging"
method is used commonly:300
f.L c (z)zdz
Z0 -Ji tc(z)dz
In the above example, defuzzification on the suspicion of fraud could
yield an output to the degree of fraud suspected on the buyer or the




seller. Of course, other factors may be involved other than the time to
sale and the perceived value and such additional inputs could be
easily added to the Mamdani direct method model.
30 '
2. Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
In a recent article, Rod Taber, a noted expert in the field of
fuzzy logic, stated: "A complex society is like a water balloon. Squeeze
it here, and the water moves there. Anything that alters one sector
will impact another. °3 0 2 The challenge, therefore, is developing a tool
to predict where the water will go before the balloon is actually
squeezed. This final piece of the puzzle requires us to establish a
means by which to symbolize the causal relationships derived from
neural networks, a term we will discuss in a moment, and to predict
outcomes in a manner easily understood and utilized by the user.
Fuzzy cognitive maps ("FCMs") provide such a means.
FCMs are fuzzy graphs which represent causal relationships
and enable the user to predict results from extremely complex rela-
tionships. 30 3 By their very nature, FCMs are able to map systems in
which both concepts and relationships are fuzzy. Equally important,
every FCM is based on a series of mathematical equations, enabling it
to be recreated on a computer, greatly simplifying the user's ability to
use and modify it.
The primary significance of FCMs lies in their ability to predict
the interaction and consequences of multiple complex events. A suc-
cessful FCM could predict both the short and long term consequences
of a judicial decision. Furthermore, unlike typical expert logic trees,
which may fail to operate smoothly when joined with one another,
combining individual FCMs yields a larger FCM.
Creating a working FCM consists of two steps: (1) concepts and
degrees of causality are assigned to a "picture" representing the issue
to be mapped by domain experts; and (2) the completed FCM is then
transferred into matrix form so that numerical values may be pro-
duced via computer to indicate the degrees to which certain concepts
affect one another.
301. See sources cited supra note 298.
302. Rod Taber, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps Model Social Systems, AI EXPERT, July 19, 1994, at
19.
303. Robert Axelrod, a political scientist, first introduced FCMs in the 1970s as a means to
graphically represent social science issues. See Bart Kosko, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps, 35 INT. J.
MAN-MACHINE STUDIES 24, 65 (1986).
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The first step in creating an FCM requires singling out the
most important "concepts," or topics germane to a particular issue to
be utilized in the FCM. Neural nets30 4 provide such a means. Human
experts can provide a means as well. Utilizing these means creates
an "expert system"-an attempt to embody the knowledge of a human
expert in a computer.
30 5
In the FCM format, concepts are called "nodes." In their sim-
plest form, nodes are fuzzy sets in that they may be activated to some
degree from 0% to 100%.306 In the simplest scenario, the nodes are
either on or off.307 Unlike most expert systems, which typically em-
ploy only one domain expert because of cost considerations, FCMs
easily combine multiple experts. 308 Thus, in order to minimize the
risk of missing crucial concepts and connections, ideally one should
use either a neural network or multiple domain experts, or even a
combination of both. As a rule, each domain expert will create a FCM
that differs with regard to concepts and causal strength. The FCMs,
however, may be averaged with others into a single FCM, which
should reflect areas of agreement and indicate areas of potential
conflict.
Nodes are connected to one another by means of numerical
values, or "edge weights," which represent "the degrees to which the
concepts interact. ' 30 9 In essence, edge weights are the equivalent of
fuzzy rules. They indicate the effect of one concept, or node, on an-
other. Rather than merely indicating the presence of an effect or no
effect, edge weights may be represented numerically by any value
between 0 and 1, or even -1 and 1.310 Thus, nodes may affect one
another by degrees, creating a model with fuzzy characteristics.
Two other fuzzy logic experts, Dickerson and Kosko, have used
FCMs to create a "virtual world. 31' They defined a virtual world as
what changes in a "virtual reality" or "cyberspace. '312 In a FCM rep-
resentation of a virtual world, the concept nodes represent events,
304. See infra notes 210-232 for a definition and discussion of neural nets.
305. The Logic That Dares Not Speak Its Name, supra note 4, at 91.
306. See Kosko, supra note 303, at 224.
307. See id.
308. See Rod Taber, Knowledge Processing with Fuzzy Cognitive Maps, 2 EXPERT SYS. WITH
APPLICATIONS 83, 85 (1991).
309. Id. at 83.
310. See Kosko, supra note 303, at 222.
311. Julie A. Dickerson & Bart Kosko, Virtual Worlds as Fuzzy Dynamical Systems, in
TECHNOLOGY FOR MULTIMEDIA 111-27 (1994).
312. Id. at 2.
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actions, values, moods, goals, or trends.313 In Dickerson and Kosko's
virtual undersea world of dolphins, sharks, and fish, concept nodes
model the interactions between predator and prey.314 An FCM virtual
world acts as a nonlinear dynamical system mapping inputs to output
equilibrium states. The output equilibrium states may end in a fixed
point, a limit cycle, or an aperiodic or chaotic attractor.
315
3. Using an FCM to Simulate Deprizio
The example that follows develops an FCM virtual world based
on the principal question in Deprizio: "whether the Trustee may re-
cover from an outside creditor under section 550(a)(1) a transfer more
than 90 days before the filing that is avoided under section 547(b)
because of a benefit for an inside creditor."316 The Augmented De-
prizio FCM consists of Simple FCMs and Nested FCMs.317 Simple
FCMs describe the judicial process: the trustee's argument, the credi-
tors' argument, and Judge Easterbrook's reasoning. Nested FCMs
describe the degree of risk that the insiders and the creditors bear.
Together, these simple FCMs and nested FCMs create a larger aug-
mented FCM that describes the judicial process and the "Real World"
of creditor, insider, and firm relationships. The purpose of this sec-
tion is not to reach a definite conclusion about Deprizio but rather to
introduce the FCM as a tool for understanding and perhaps predicting
how judicial decisions affect business behavior.
The trustee's argument is linear and based on a literal reading
of the Bankruptcy Code.318 As a simple FCM, eight nodes arranged in
four layers can describe the trustee's argument. The first layer con-
tains one node (T1) which simply represents the fact that the trustee
has an argument. The second layer consists of facts specific to the
case: Guarantor is an officer (T2); Guarantor has a claim (T3); and
transfer from Firm to Creditor benefits Creditor (T4). The third layer
of the trustee's FCM incorporates Bankruptcy Code provisions to
reach intermediate inferences: § 101(30)(B)(ii) transforms node T2 to
node T5 (Guarantor is an insider); §§ 101(9) and 101(4)(A) transform
313. See id.
314. For example, dolphins swim away as the degree of survival threat increases. See id.
315. See id. at 3.
316. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir. 1989).
317. See Dickerson & Kosko, supra note 311, at 11, 13, 15.
318. As Judge Easterbrook stated, "[tihe trustee's argument for extended recovery from
outside creditors flows directly from these interlocked provisions [of the Bankruptcy Code]."
Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1190.
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node T3 to node T6 (Guarantor is a creditor); and § 547(b)(4) trans-
forms node T4 to T7 (Guarantor's benefit is avoidable). The fourth
layer combines the intermediate inferences to reach the final conclu-
sion that the trustee sought: "Lender may have to repay transfers
received during the year before filing [for bankruptcy], even though







The creditor's argument on the principal question relies on a
two-benefit/two-transfer theory.3 20 The creditor's FCM, like that of
the trustee, has four layers. However, only six nodes are used to
model the creditor's argument. The first layer contains one node (C1)
which simply represents the fact that the creditor has an argument.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 1191.
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The second layer contains the basic theory: the payment benefits the
Lender (C2) and the Guarantor (C3).321 The third layer supposes that
a benefit equals a transfer and it uses the Code to determine if the
resulting individual transfers are "avoidable." According to §
547(b)(5), a transfer is avoidable only to the extent it gives the credi-
tor more than the creditor would have received in a liquidation under
Chapter 7.322 Using this definition and the fact that the Guarantor's
interest is junior to the Lender's, the Creditor's argument produces
concept nodes C4 (transfer to Lender is unavoidable) and C5 (transfer
to Guarantor is avoidable). Using § 550(a), the Creditor arrives at the
fourth layer node C6.323 The node C6 represents the proposition that
the trustee can recover only from the Guarantor for transfers made
less than one year and beyond ninety days from filing.324 Illustration
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322. See id. at 1195.
323. See id. at 1191; see also supra note 56 (defining two-benefit/two-transfer theory).
324. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1191.
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A three layer simple FCM can likewise model Easterbrook's
reasoning on both arguments. Easterbrook approaches the principal
question using textualism and economic theory. These are repre-
sented in the first layer as nodes El (textualism) and E2 (economic
theory). The second layer consists of three nodes. Node E3 repre-
sents Easterbrook's interpretation of § 101(9): a claim against the
firm makes one a creditor 25 Node E4 represents his textualist read-
ing of §§ 547(b)(1) and 101(50): a payment is a transfer, a benefit is
not a transfer. 26 Node E5 contains Easterbrook's notion that the
whole of the firm should be preserved.327 The third layer transforms
economic node E5 to node E6 which asserts "all creditors gain from a
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To achieve an augmented FCM representation of the entire
case, the three simple FCMs are placed side by side. The next step is
325. See id. at 1194.
326. See id. at 1195-96.




to link the FCMs with appropriate edge weights {-1,+1}. Once linked,
the augmented FCM connection matrix can be formed from the indi-
vidual FCM connection matrices. Converting the FCMs to connection
matrix form will become apparent later as it facilitates the program-
ming, or "bookkeeping," of more complex relationships in larger aug-
mented FCMs. The matrices for our model can be found in Appendix
II.
Nested FCMs in the Real World FCM
When a firm borrows money, both the creditor and the firm
engage in a transaction that reflects their respective levels of risk.
The level of risk depends on many variables, including the prevailing
rule of law. Deprizio acts to heighten the creditor's risk level, ex-
tending the preference window from 90 to 365 days. The heightened
level of risk induces creditors to ask firms to waive claims to their
assets in the case of bankruptcy. In turn, the insider who has issued
bank guarantees experiences a heightened level of risk.
The insider's perception of risk will influence the firm's deci-
sions on borrowing money. On the other hand, if "Barking Dog" pre-
vails, then the creditor's risk is low and the creditor is unlikely to
convince the firm's insiders to waive their rights to assets.
The creditor risk concept, elaborated as subconcepts of high
(N5) and low degrees of risk (N6), when linked to the insider's waiver
of a claim to assets, forms a nested simple FCM. The insider risk
concept, also elaborated as subconcepts of high (N1) and low degrees
of risk (N2), links to the waiver and the decision for the firm to issue
guarantees. The nested FCMs are shown below linked to their com-
mon nodes, N3, "Insiders Waive Claim to Firm's Assets" and N4,
"Firm Issues Guarantees."
Illustration 9




Note that the insider actions affect insider risk. Thus, if the firm
issues guarantees or the insiders waive claims to assets, the degree of
insider risk rises. Likewise, if these actions do not occur, the degree
of insider risk falls.
As shown above, the edge weights are represented as pluses
and minuses or {-1, +1}. However, this need not be the case. Any
fuzzy weight can be assigned to the edges, representing the degree to
which the risk rises or falls. Fuzzy reasoning models, as presented for
the BFP case, can be used to determine the weights. In a similar
manner, weights can be assigned to the edges affecting the center
nodes. Thus, one can investigate the degree to which insiders are
willing to issue guarantees or the degree to which the insiders are
willing to waive claims to assets. The connection matrix and the
mathematical procedure for determining its properties are found in
Appendix III.
The simple risk FCM, as with the simple FCMs for the De-
prizio decision, can also be represented in matrix form. However, to
form a more complete model of the real world affected by the Deprizio
decision, it is helpful to introduce a few more concepts. Preferential
transfers to insider-backed creditors lower insider risk levels. The
other two important concepts are the rules of law before and immedi-
ately after Deprizio. Depending on the state of the law, creditor risk
either will be high or low and preferential transfers either will occur
or will not.
As an augmented FCM, the "Real World" of creditor and firm

















-4 ---- im Two WV Effect
The bridge between the judicial decision FCM and the Real
World FCM is traversed by linking nodal concepts in the Trustee's
and Creditor's arguments to the Real World. The links are straight-
forward: T8 -+ R1, {+1} and C6 -- R2, {+1}. However, with Easter-
brook's textual and economic theories intervening, only Ri will fire.
The corresponding connection matrix for the Real World is shown
below complete while the FCM for the judicial decision and the Real






Simulations of the Deprizio FCM and Real World FCM
The complete system, shown in Illustration 11, has been used
as the basis for several simulations. The first simulation is for the
actual Deprizio case and its effect on the Real World. To start, an
input vector activates the Trustee's Argument (Ti), the Creditor's




The choice of input vector leads the FCM to a limit cycle.329
The limit cycle has four steps. It starts with "Creditor Risk is High"
(R4), a direct result of the Deprizio decision. The high degree of risk
experienced by the creditors leads to "Insiders Waive Claim to Assets"
(R5) in the second step. In turn, the insiders' behavior increases their
degree of risk in the third step, "Insider Risk is High" (R7). In the
fourth step, the insiders no longer choose to waive their claim to the
firm's assets, although their risk remains high. The return to the
first step, the beginning of the limit cycle, occurs next by a moderation
of insider risk. In reality, one can imagine that the insiders no longer
participate in the credit system. Thus, their degree of risk dimin-
ishes. The creditors' risk remains high, however, as long as Deprizio
is in effect and there is a need to make an acceptable rate of return on
their money. At this point, it may be attractive for the insiders to
once again participate and to ask again for insiders to waive their
claim to the firm's assets. Overall, even as a simple non-adaptive
FCM with no time dependent variables, the results are meaningful.
The next simulation examines the effect of the Creditors' Ar-
gument unimpeded by the arguments of the Trustees or Easterbrook.
The initial input vector is simply "Creditors' Argument" (C 1).
The creditors' argument alone produces a different limit cy-
cle.330 Here, as before, it is a four step limit cycle. The first step is
"Creditor Risk is Low" (R3) and 'Preferential Transfers to Insider
Backed Creditors" (R9). These conditions are a direct result of
"Barking Dog. '331 In the second step, the behavior of preferential
transfers acts to lower the degree of insider risk (R8). In the next
step, the low insider risk encourages the firm to start issuing more
insider guarantees (R6). The issuance of more insider-backed guaran-
tees, however, acts to increase the degree of insider risk. In this last
step, insider risk is not "high," but it is to a sufficient degree not
"low."
As with the previous simulation, the results are instructive.
Time dependence and variable edge weights could be used to improve
the FCM. With variable edge weights, it may be possible to track
changes in the degree of insider risk and to predict at which degree
their behavior will trigger the firm to issue guarantees.
The next simulation looks at a change in law from "Barking
Dog" to Deprizio. In this situation, the system adjusts to the Deprizio
329. For a list of the input vectors and corresponding codes, see infra Appendix IV, Part I.
330. For a list of the input vectors and corresponding codes, see infra Appendix IV, Part II.
331. See supra note 242.
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Limit Cycle in just two iterations. 32 The third input vector is Step III
of the Deprizio Limit Cycle. The second input vector shows that the
firm is still issuing guarantees even though the law has changed and
preferential transfers have stopped. As shown in the previous exam-
ples, the increase in degree of creditor risk leads to insider waivers
and an increase in the degree of insider risk as well.
These three simulations show some of the benefits of virtual
world FCM modeling. The three examples are to a large extent fo-
cused on the "Real World" FCM. However, the main focus is indeed
the "Real World" and how the prevailing law influences the creditor
system. Next, it is instructive to take a closer look at the judicial
decision FCM to see how a change in Easterbrook's reasoning may
influence the "Real World" outcome.
Two different input vectors are examined: Easterbrook With-







Guarantor is an Officer (T2)
Guarantor has a Claim (T3)
Payment made to Creditor (T4)
Preserve Whole of Firm (E5)
Payment Benefits Creditor (C2)
Payment Benefits Guarantor (C3)
Third Input Vector:
Guarantor is an Insider (T5)
Guarantor is a Creditor (T6)
Avoidable Transfer Benefits Guarantor (T7)
Creditor Hold Back (E6)
Creditor Transfer is not Avoidable (C4)
Guarantor Transfer is Avoidable (C5)
Fourth Input Vector:
Trustee can Recover from Creditor or Guarantor (T8)
332. For a list of the input vectors and corresponding codes, see infra Appendix IV, Part III.
[Vol. 52:12431308
FUZZY LOGIC




As can be seen by the results, both arguments go forth when Easter-
brook does not use his textualist approach. The "Real World" FCM is
impeded since Deprizio (RI) and Barking Dog (R2) cancel each other;
in other words, they are mutually exclusive. Thus, the FCM predicts
that Easterbrook could have not decided the case based on his eco-
nomic theory alone.






Guarantor is an Officer (T2)
Guarantor has a Claim (T3)
Payment made to Creditor (T4)
Claim makes a Creditor (E3)
Payment = Transfer, Benefit # Transfer (E4)
Payment Benefits Creditor (C2)
Payment Benefits Guarantor (C3)
Third Input Vector:
Guarantor is an Insider (T5)
Guarantor is a Creditor (T6)
Avoidable Transfer Benefits Guarantor (T7)
Creditor Transfer is not Avoidable (C4)
Fourth Input Vector:
Trustee can Recover from Creditor or Guarantor (T8)






As with the previous example's results, both arguments go forth when
Easterbrook does not use his economic theory. Again, the "Real
World" FCM is impeded since Deprizio (RI) and Barking Dog (R2)
cancel each other. Thus, the FCM predicts that Easterbrook could
have not decided the case based on his textualism alone.
In conclusion, Easterbrook has taken two theories, both weak,
and juxtaposed them to arrive at a decision-a decision that could not
have been arrived at by the use of formalism alone. Easterbrook
could only have reached the decision through the use of a "balancing"
of economic theory with textualism-something that looks strikingly
similar to practical reasoning. The virtual world FCM shows that
either theory by itself is insufficient to reproduce Easterbrook's De-
prizio decision. Our virtual world FCM does, however, lack time
dependency and adaptive weights. To improve upon this example,
fuzzy reasoning models may be introduced to modify weights and time
dependency to mimic dynamic economic realities. For instance, the
length of time that a firm "sits out" may be related to the degree of
risk and the rate at which the risk dissipates due to market condi-
tions. The basic principles behind such an adaptive approach follow.
4. Adaptive Fuzzy Systems and Neural Networks
A discussion of fuzzy logic and fuzzy cognitive maps would not
be complete without a brief overview of adaptive fuzzy systems and
neural nets, including their structure and uses. Perhaps the single
most important step in achieving an efficient fuzzy system is devel-
oping the appropriate fuzzy rules. Unfortunately, this is often the
most difficult process. Indeed, one commentator has stated, "[t]he
Achilles' heel of a fuzzy system is its rules."333 It may well be that the
system to be modeled is so complex that the concepts and relation-
ships underlying the fuzzy rules are not easily discovered. Earlier,
this section of the -Article suggested that "domain experts" could be
used to develop fuzzy rules, but in many cases this may prove too
difficult. As an alternative, engineers have developed "adaptive fuzzy
systems" that utilize "neural networks" to actually formulate and
modify the fuzzy rules.
333. Kosko & Isaka, supra note 5, at 80.
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An adaptive fuzzy system is a fuzzy system which learns its
rules from data using a neural net, rather than a human expert.
334
Data (input) is fed into a computerized neural net which then pro-
duces the desired result (output). Adaptive fuzzy systems take the
inputs and outputs and express the relationship between the two as
fuzzy rules. In this way, the requisite fuzzy rules used to run the
system are developed. In a sense, the neural net supplants the hu-
man expert. The adaptive fuzzy system is then run using these newly
created rules. Significantly, as data changes, so too do the rules.
Initially, the fuzzy rules may be very general, but with additional
expert information, the rules become more precise. 335
Neural networks can replace human experts, sometimes very
effectively. In a general sense, neural networks resemble the human
brain, primarily because neural nets are capable of "learning" through
experience. Neural nets operate by recognizing patterns in data and
associating the patterns. These associations then become the fuzzy
rules in an adaptive fuzzy system. Arguably more astute than their
human counterparts, neural nets can recognize hidden patterns
within vast amounts of information.3 36 This is particularly helpful
when devising rules for an extremely complex system such as a par-
ticularly intricate area of the law.
Neural networks are able to perform complex data association
because of their unique structure. A neural network is a collection of
"neurons" and "synapses" that change their values in response to
inputs from surrounding neurons and synapses.3 37 Inputs are mapped
to outputs. Neurons add up all incoming signals from other neurons
and then produce a value in response.338 Signals travel via the syn-
apses, which have numerical values that weight the flow of neuronal
signals.3 39 Neural nets 'learn" by increasing the strength of the syn-
apses. Supervised neural nets can 'learn" with the assistance of an
expert human. The expert can act to correct the net until it responds
334. See Kosko, supra note 303, at 287.
335. In 1989, Dr. Bart Kosko developed a fuzzy system that simulated backing a truck and
trailer up to a loading dock. He began by using a neural net to ascertain the fuzzy rules. He did
this by feeding in hundreds of truck paths. The system developed 105 fuzzy rules to efficiently
back the trailer up. As more information was introduced, the rules became more precise. See
Kosko, supra note 303, at 204-05.
336. Chase Manhattan Bank utilized a neural network to assist in reducing costs resulting
from stolen credit cards. Information was introduced into the net and it discovered, among
other things, that the most questionable sales were for women's shoes priced between $40 and
$80. See MCNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 8, at 229.





correctly to every input. Significantly, supervised neural nets can be
used to "tune" imprecise fuzzy rules initially devised by human ex-
perts. As vast amounts of data are run through the neural net, the
rules are refined by allowing the net to vary the fuzzy sets slightly in
order to determine the best possible result.
5. Fuzzy Formalism
What does all of this talk of neural nets, FCMs, and so forth,
have to do with judges? Ironically, its relevance is probably clearest
for formalist judges. The critical point about formalism is that the
judge has a finite, pre-defined set of factors that are relevant to the
decision. This set probably includes dictionary meaning, linguistic
canons, plain statement rules, and stare decisis. This Article dis-
cussed earlier how experts learn to decode a confused factual situa-
tion into a manageable set of familiar factors. Fuzzy logic shows how
they can learn to combine these factors into a decision in a workable
way. Like neural nets, formalist judges need not learn an explicit set
of second-order rules in order to move from their identification of the
case's relevant features to a decision about the outcome. They can
learn over time how to weigh the factors they consider relevant in
order to reach a decision. This analysis reveals how, at the heart of
formalism, lies recourse to a process much like what antiformalists
call practical reasoning.
While formalism is inherently fuzzy, antiformalist legal analy-
sis is inevitably structured. Clearly, pragmatists believe that they are
advocating something more substantial than the use of raw intui-
tion.340 Judge Richard Posner, for example, provides an extensive list
of cognitive techniques, including analogy, induction, pattern recogni-
tion, tacit knowledge, and reliance on social experience.3 4 1 Anthony
Kronman rejects intuitionism more explicitly. He admits that if good
judgment requires more than deduction, it is "tempting to conclude"
that good judgment instead must consist of intuition.342 In short,
340. See Phillip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1218-19 (1990) (discussing interpretive
theories).
341. See POSNER, supra note 258, at 86, 91, 105, 108-12.
342. Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 848 (1987). Kronman
notes that someone who has good judgment "is not someone who from time to time merely
makes certain strikingly appropriate oracular pronouncements-that is what prophets and
seers do-but who is able, as well, to provide a compelling framework of ideas for the decisions
he or she arrives at." Id. at 849. These decisions are "not deducible by reason alone, but neither
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Kronman says, good judgment "has an argumentative dimension
which its equation with intuitive genius obscures.
'34 3
Moreover, cognitive psychology and fuzzy logic both cast doubt
upon the very concept of a purely ad hoc intuitive judgment. Experts
develop the capacity to identify recurrent patterns-so that they later
"intuitively" classify and interpret data in ways that are not obvious
to the novice. It is the novice whose decisions are most ad hoc, be-
cause he lacks the experience needed to spot pattern formation. What
Llewellyn called "situation sense,"344 and others have derided as
nothing more than formless intuition, seems to be the characteristic
response of the human mind to repeated problem-solving efforts.
Moreover, fuzzy logic shows that what lawyers call "balancing," and
often attack as essentially arbitrary, is in principle reducible to un-
derstandable (though non-binary) rules. Even a neural net, which
obviously does not actually understand any rules or perceive any
patterns, behaves as if it were learning these concepts. It is at least
plausible to speculate that even when humans think they are being ad
hoc, they are responding, as neural nets do, on the basis of learned
patterns and fuzzy rules.
In any event, it is highly doubtful that any antiformalist has
ever advocated abolishing all rules, doing away with all precedents,
and ignoring statutory language. In reality, there is a great deal of
common ground between formalists and antiformalists, which is
obscured by the heat of the debate between them. First, formalists, as
much as antiformalists, cannot possibly expect to reduce all of legal
reasoning to crisp bright-line rules. As we have seen, even if a com-
plete body of such rules could be stated, the formalist would still need
to resort to fuzzy logic and practical reasoning in order to apply the
rules. Second, formalists and antiformalists alike believe in the use-
fulness of legal predictability, stability, and, therefore, rules for
making decisions.
The debate is really about a matter of degree. 345 On the one
hand, formalists believe that the legal landscape should be covered as
much as possible with a detailed network of explicit rules, in the hope
that difficult cases requiring expert judgment can be reduced to the
is their soundness entirely self-evident-something we either see or not depending on our own
powers of intuitive comprehension." Id. at 849-50.
343. Id. at 850.
344. LLEWELLYN, supra note 244, at 403.
345. Consequently, the choice of interpretive methods turns in significant part on empirical
questions regarding the behavior of judges and legislators. See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Formalism and Statutory Interpretation: Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 636 (1999).
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minimum. On the other hand, antiformalists are not upset at the
idea of large gaps, wherein implicit fuzzy judgments replace explicit
rules. This difference in emphasis is not insignificant, but it should
not obscure the very real areas of agreement.
Much of the debate over formalism is really a debate about the
usefulness of explicit rules versus implicit knowledge. It is tempting
to say that one should try to make all rules as explicit as possible, in
order to maximize the stability, predictability, and democratic ac-
countability of the legal system. In reality, explicitness is like other
human goods: it is valuable, but costly to produce and suffers from
diminishing returns.
Demands that the legislature make all legal rules explicit
rather than relying on the audience to apply implicit rules greatly
increase the cost of producing legislation. Indeed, artificial intelli-
gence researchers have found it incredibly difficult to reduce even
routine human activities to explicit rules. One of the advantages of
fuzzy logic and neural nets is that they model behavior through trial
and error without requiring the researcher to work out a set of ex-
plicit rules in advance.
On the benefit side, explicit rules also have their limits. Even
experts do much of their work without the benefit of explicit rules.
Sometimes, an implicit rule may be a much more understandable and
predictable guide to behavior than the equivalent set of explicit rules.
Consider the directive to drive carefully. Perhaps, with work, one
could translate this into a set of explicit rules that state the correct
driving action in almost every imaginable scenario (taking into ac-
count the speeds and location of all vehicles, the layout of the road-
way, weather conditions, etc.). Would the ordinary driver be better
served by a multi-volume treatise on driving, or by the directive to
"drive carefully, especially when traffic is heavy or the weather is
bad"? This directive is very general, but specific enough to remind the
audience to employ a huge set of implicit rules they have already
mastered. Trying to make the rules explicit would simply cause intol-
erable confusion. On the other hand, "just do it" is probably a little
too open-ended. Thus, the optimum amount of explicitness is a mat-
ter of degree, like most of life.3 46
346. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 542-47 (4th ed. 1992).
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IlI. INTERPRETING COMPLEX STATUTES IN A Fuzzy WORLD
Much of the scholarship on statutory interpretation focuses on
broad theoretical issues, uses only thumbnail sketches of what are
actually complicated cases, and ignores the full complexity of most
modern statutes. Part of this Article's purpose is to paint a fuller
picture of the process of interpretation as it actually takes place in the
today's world. Part I examined two well-known bankruptcy cases in
great detail. Part II put to the side the debate between formalists and
antiformalists, and instead tried to shed light on the kinds of reason-
ing processes judges must employ regardless of their jurisprudential
orientation if they are to do their jobs well. Part II also used cognitive
psychology and fuzzy logic to shed light on these cognitive skills. Part
III now will consider some of the general lessons of that literature for
the question of the circumstances under which judges are likely to
perform well at the task of interpreting complex statutes. In par-
ticular, this Part will consider whether the appellate courts in De-
prizio and BFP could have improved their performances.
A. Deferring to 'Tront-line" Interpreters
In Part II, we saw that various kinds of implicit knowledge are
critical to forming expert judgments. One type of knowledge is in-
volved in pattern recognition-the knowledge that enables the expert
radiologist to interpret what to the novice is only a blurry shadow.
Research shows that this type of knowledge is mostly the product of
extensive experience.3 47 Recall that becoming a chess master takes
ten or twenty thousand hours of study and playing experience. A
novice player, no matter how gifted, lacks the benefit of this experi-
ence. The rules of the Bankruptcy Code are much longer and more
complex than those of chess. A full-time bankruptcy judge, in the
course of several years, spends as much time working with the Code,
case law, and procedural rules as a chess master spends on chess.
Correspondingly, the specialist judge is, expected to have the same
advantage over the generalist appellate judge in the "game" of bank-
ruptcy law as the experienced chess master has over the gifted novice.
While it is true that some legal skills can be generalized across fields,
applying a statute as complicated as the Bankruptcy Code in any
particular case involves grasping the interactions of numerous statu-
tory provisions, legal doctrines, and business practices.
347. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
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As in chess, mastery of bankruptcy law also involves an appre-
ciation of how the other player (business firms and bankruptcy law-
yers) will respond to a given move. Because of the complexity of the
Code and the related business and state law issues, this requires
developing the equivalent of an extensive FCM showing the interac-
tions involved. Even in the brightest individual, such a complex FCM
is likely to develop only after extensive exposure.
Deprizio is a good example of this complexity. Judge Easter-
brook makes a formidable effort to examine the interrelationships
between the relevant code provisions and to consider the potential
responses to his proposed rule. Even so, it is doubtful that he fully
appreciated the scope of the complexities. His assessment of the
situation emphasized some features while ignoring others.
348
As a general matter, federal appellate judges presumably have
better credentials, wider legal horizons, and more sophisticated juris-
prudential understandings than bankruptcy judges. Thus, their
explicit knowledge of law and legal theory is probably stronger, and it
is tempting for them to think of bankruptcy judges as merely more
limited or less talented versions of themselves. In reality, however,
bankruptcy judges accumulate a wealth of implicit knowledge that
the generalist judge cannot duplicate. Consequently, appellate judges
should defer to the expert judgment of bankruptcy judges to a higher
degree than they do today.
349
Such deference could take two forms. First, where there is a
strong consensus among bankruptcy judges regarding the correct
solution to a problem, appellate judges should be reluctant to adopt a
different answer except for compelling reasons. Roughly speaking,
appellate judges should regard such a strong consensus roughly the
way they regard a precedent from their own court. An exception
should be recognized where a bankruptcy issue involves policies ex-
ternal to creditor-debtor relations, such as regulatory statutes or
labor law. Those policies are likely to fall outside the scope of the
bankruptcy judge's expertise.
Congress has already recognized the value of deferring to the
expert judgment of bankruptcy judges. The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978350 gave the judicial councils of each circuit the discretion to
create a bankruptcy appellate panel of three bankruptcy judges to
348. See supra Part I.B.1.
349. Thus, judges are in a position similar to that of the "sub domain expert" in Weinstein's
study. See Weinstein, supra note 259, at 40-42.
350. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994).
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hear certain appeals in bankruptcy cases.351 Congress strengthened
the policy in favor of such appellate panels by making them virtually
mandatory in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.352
Second, even where the bankruptcy judges do not agree on a
solution, they may at least agree on the parameters of the problem.
For example, they may agree that a problem involves a conflict be-
tween the literal meaning of a section and the broad policies of the
Code, but disagree about how to resolve the conflict. In this situation,
appellate judges cannot defer to a nonexistent consensus. They can,
however, defer to the way that the bankruptcy judges have framed
the problem, and refrain from the temptation to cleverly mobilize
novel attacks on the problem. The odds are all too high that the novel
methods either will not work, or will produce subtle and unexpected
side-effects, causing more problems than they solve.
B. Living with Ambiguity
According to fuzzy logic, most questions do not have black or
white answers; the world mostly consists of shades of gray. One flaw
in both Deprizio and BFP is that the judges are convinced that their
answer, and only their answer, is the complete truth. Yet, neither
case would have been so controversial if the answer had indeed been
so clear.
Justice Scalia's opinion in BFP, for example, reflects utter
confidence that any other analysis of the case would be intellectually
bankrupt.35 3 Yet Justice Souter does a formidable job of analyzing the
same legal materials, using the same formalist methods, to demon-
strate the opposite conclusion. 35 4
The fact is that BFP was not an easy case. For the reasons
explained by Justice Souter, the statutory text taken as a whole
seemed to strongly favor the debtor.355 The creditors had two power-
ful arguments. First, Congress had not very clearly manifested any
reason for federal oversight over the traditional state domain of real
estate foreclosures.35 6 Second, Congress clearly did not mean to estab-
lish a standard of fair market value, which is the only obvious alter-
351. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy 5.02[3] (1998).
352. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994).
353. See discussion supra Part I.C.
354. Id.
355. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 549-70 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
356. See id. at 564-66.
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native to the result of the state foreclosure sale.3517 Neither the ma-
jority nor the dissent were willing to confront the difficulties-each
simply assumed away the other side of the case. In particular, Justice
Scalia strove mightily to avoid acknowledging the powerful textual
arguments against his position, in the process compromising the
integrity of his own textualist philosophy.
A fuller analysis of BFP would require a careful consideration
of the specific textual provisions at issue. It would also benefit from
an analysis of the kind Judge Easterbrook attempted in Deprizio of
how the general policies of the Bankruptcy Code would be impacted
by allowing exceptional treatment for foreclosure proceedings. 38 On
the other hand, it would also be necessary to give careful attention to
the state policies involved and the extent to which they would be
disrupted, and to the problem of providing a usable alternative meas-
uring stick for equivalent value. Quite likely, all of these factors
would not point in the same direction, and the result would turn on
the weight given each factor in the FCM. At least, however, the result
would have been a judicial opinion that gave lawyers and judges some
guidance about how to approach similar problems in the future. In
contrast, the hodgepodge of arguments that the majority dished up in
BFP promise very little assistance in resolving future bankruptcy
problems.
If, as the literature in cognitive psychology suggests, expertise
is partly learned from working through specific problems, one func-
tion of an appellate opinion should be to serve as a demonstration of
successful problem-solving methodologies. BFP, unfortunately, has
limited value for that purpose.
C. Statutory Cultures
Formalist writers stress that law contains a good many rules,
and that in many contexts, the application of those rules requires
little more than a grasp of English usage. They recommend a heavier
reliance on plain meaning in statutory interpretation for several
reasons. First, it would improve democratic legitimacy, since most
legislators vote on the language of a bill and "that language is often
ordinary language.''3 59 Second, it would encourage careful drafting
357. See id. at 550.
358. See supra Part I.B.
359. Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1302,
1320 (1991) (book review).
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and would avoid the need for judges to make complex legislative
judgments for which they are ill-suited. More importantly, "judicial
adherence to the ordinary meaning of ordinary words in the statute
restricts the opportunity for strong-willed judges to substitute their
own personal political views for those of the legislature with respect
to ends and means. ' 360 Finally, adherence to ordinary meaning pro-
vides fairer notice to the public. 3 61 In short, these are the virtues of
the democratic rule of law.
36 2
This argument may apply to garden-variety criminal laws, but
not to the complex federal statutes that often face federal courts.
Most important, federal statutes today are not addressed to the ordi-
nary citizen. Rather, they are addressed to more specialized audi-
ences-sometimes federal agencies (directions to engage in rulemak-
ing), legal specialists (corporate tax revisions), or particular industries
(public utility regulation). Less sophisticated individuals often rely on
official compliance guides or experts' publications to understand the
statute, rather than deciphering the statutory language themselves.
The more sophisticated audience approaches the statutes with a rich
contextual understanding of previous law, the politics of the enact-
ment, the affected business activity, and the dynamics of legal imple-
mentation in the area. If the official interpreters of the statute down-
play these factors in favor of dictionary meaning, the most knowl-
edgeable readers of the statute must artificially attempt to put aside
their sophistication and seek to understand how a willfully ignorant
outsider would read the statute. As with the drafter of the statute,
the need to perform these mental gymnastics will make it more diffi-
cult for the experts to understand the meaning of the statute.
360. Id.
361. See id. at 1321.
362. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232. Schauer also argues that the Supreme Court has
increasingly adopted ordinary language because it allows judges who do not share substantive
values to decide cases easily and quickly. See id. This assertion seems empirically question-
able. If ordinary language were adopted in order to economize on disputes between judges with
varying values, it should have been adopted around 1975-1980, when the Court had the greatest
range of ideological positions. In the 1989 term, which is Schauer's subject, only a few liberals
were left on the Court, so that overall the Court was much more ideologically homogeneous. It
is also unclear whether the plain meaning approach actually does create consensus. Consider,
for example, Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), in which a bare majority thought that the
outcome was dictated by the plain meaning of the statute, see id. at 237, while the dissenters
found "nothing in the language of the statute" to support the majority's result, id. at 256
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The court of appeals had found "as a matter of common sense and
common English" that the statute meant just the opposite of the interpretation adopted by the
majority of the justices. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 796 (1st Cir. 1983).
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In this respect, the Bankruptcy Code is typical of modern
complex statutes. As early as the Chandler Act of 1938,363 which
significantly amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,364 specialist or-
ganizations 365 were heavily involved in the drafting of the statute.
366
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978367 was the prod-
uct of eight years of testimony, debate, and lobbying in Congress.
Congress delegated the initial task of making findings and recom-
mendations concerning bankruptcy reform to a special Commission to
Study the Bankruptcy Law of the United States in 1970.368 The
Commission filed its report with Congress on July 30, 1973.369 From
that time to the Bankruptcy Reform Act's enactment five years later,
Congress "constantly sought and received the counsel and advice of
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges[,] the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference, [and] the Judicial Conference of the United
States.' 370 The National Bankruptcy Conference was also very in-
volved with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.371 By this Act, Con-
gress also established a National Bankruptcy Review Commission to
further study the Bankruptcy Code and submit recommendations for
improvements.
372
In this process of lawmaking, the meaning that an ordinary
uninformed citizen or legislator might attach to the Code or its
amendments is virtually irrelevant. The Code was intended primarily
for the use of lawyers, most of them specialists, who share many
forms of knowledge, both implicit and explicit. The drafters primarily
had to be concerned with how this intended audience would under-
stand and respond to the provisions, for the point of the legislation
was to shape the behavior of the specialists and of the businesses that
they advised. In a sense, all the key players, from drafters, lobbyists,
363. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
364. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
365. Examples include the National Bankruptcy Conference, the National Association of
Referees in Bankruptcy, the Commercial Law League, the National Association of Credit Men,
and the American Bar Association.
366. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 101[1][a (1998).
367. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
368. The commission was created by Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
369. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973).
370. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY xxiii (1998) (remarks of Hon. M. Caldwell Butler, United
States Representative from Virginia).
371. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994); see generally THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
CONFERENCE, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 1994).




and staff members to bankruptcy lawyers and bankruptcy judges,
shared a common specialized culture-an FCM.
The reaction to Deprizio, by bankruptcy lawyers, scholars, and
ultimately by Congress, is an example of how resistant this culture
can be to a violation of its implicit norms. Judge Easterbrook's opin-
ion probably sparked such a strong reaction for two reasons. First,
the opinion's combination of textual literalism and economic analysis
to the exclusion of all other factors violated the implicit rhetorical
norms of the culture-Easterbrook was not only using different
weightings, but operating with a different cognitive map. Second, the
result in the case was a sharp deviation from settled expectations
among most bankruptcy insiders. In short, the opinion suffered from
what one professor once referred to as excessive "brilliance.
'373
Recently, Bill Eskridge has written more generally about the
reasons for judges to respect existing legal and institutional practices
when interpreting statutes, except where there is a strong normative
reason for disrupting existing practice.37 4 But the judge who attempts
such a rupture must keep in mind the likelihood that he may only
succeed in mobilizing the legal system's immune system, neutralizing
his effort at change.
The bankruptcy statute, like the typical federal regulatory
statute, has two characteristics that make its culture especially resis-
tant to change. The first characteristic is its complexity. That com-
plexity provides opportunities for insiders to restore the status quo, as
creditors' lawyers did by using waivers of reimbursement from the
debtor corporation to guarantors. The second characteristic involves a
distinction from litigation-oriented statutes such as the antitrust
laws. The antitrust laws were subject to a successful effort at rupture
by Chicago-style economics in the 1970s. Antitrust litigators, how-
ever, are probably less specialized than bankruptcy lawyers. Cases
are heard by generalist district judges rather than specialized non-
Article III judges. Also, much like the regulatory process, bankruptcy
involves much intensive and informal interaction rather than merely
discrete adversary trials. Only a small percentage of bankruptcy
issues ever reach an Article III court, let alone a court of appeals or
the Supreme Court. Thus, bankruptcy law, like complex regulatory
373. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986).
374. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Progress, 94 MICH. L.




statutes, is likely to be quite resistant to efforts by a generalist ap-
pellate judge to transform the current cognitive map.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article began by noting that judges tinker with the legal
system all the time. In evaluating their tinkering, scholars and oth-
ers have written extensively about the precise methodology judges
employ in such tinkering. Should judges render a decision based
merely on the words of the text before them or should they go one step
further and attempt to discern the purpose of the legislation at issue?
Is it legitimate for judges to consult current social values? On one side
of the debate are formalists, who eschew legislative history and cur-
rent social values while being suspicious of the concept of statutory
purpose. On the other side are antiformalists, who would prefer to
downplay textual arguments in favor of these other sources of guid-
ance.
This significant debate has been seriously limited in some
respects. First, the debaters have focused on the differences between
formalism and antiformalism (or "practical reasoning"), ignoring
considerable areas of overlap. Second, much of the discussion has
involved stylized examples, often in the context of fairly simple stat-
utes, rather than the complexities presented by actual judicial deci-
sions under complicated modern statutory schemes. Third, neither
side has a very clear model of the process that judges actually use to
make decisions. This Article sought to move beyond the current de-
bate about formalism by focusing on these issues and by providing
insights into rules or useable models of judicial decisionmaking.
Normally, formalists and antiformalists alike resort to "hand waving"
when seeking to describe the judge's cognitive process. This Article
has attempted to provide some substance to our description of this
process by referring to work by cognitive psychologists on expert
judgments, and to an emerging field known as fuzzy logic.
More specifically, Part I of this Article examined two cele-
brated recent bankruptcy decisions that utilize different varieties of
formalism. After examining these cases, Part II showed how cognitive
psychology and fuzzy logic illuminate the reasoning processes used by
formalist and antiformalist judges alike. To apply even formalist
rules, judges need to recognize the aspects of a case that trigger rele-
vant rules. This type of diagnostic process has been the subject of
cognitive psychologists' research on expert reasoning. Once the judge
has identified the appropriate rules, she may find that they point in
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conflicting directions. Fuzzy logic provided us with a model of how to
analyze such conflicts. This Article used that model in the context of
Deprizio, where we demonstrated that even formalist judges are
compelled to make and rely on non-formalist judgments or determina-
tions.
Part III considered how these models of judicial decisionmak-
ing might inform efforts to improve statutory interpretation of com-
plex statutes like the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, expert deci-
sionmaking builds on pattern recognition skills and fuzzy maps, both
of which are the result of intensive repeated experience. Conse-
quently, bankruptcy judges are probably in a better position than
generalist appellate judges to maneuver among the complexities of
the Code and to accommodate the values and interests at stake. Also,
because of the complexity of these statutory schemes, and of the cor-
responding fuzzy cognitive maps, judges would do well to acknowledge
that competing considerations are involved in almost every interest-
ing case. The implicit understandings of bankruptcy "insiders," both
in the legislative process and in bankruptcy practice and adjudication,
are strongly entrenched and difficult to displace. In short, generalist
judges should approach bankruptcy issues with a strong degree of
deference to the 'local culture" of the field.
Of course, the full subtleties of judicial reasoning will un-
doubtedly always remain beyond the grasp of psychologists, artificial
intelligence or fuzzy logic researchers, or experts. But the results in
Part II suggest that fuzzy cognitive maps and neural nets may well
illuminate key aspects of judicial reasoning. Indeed, even self-
described formalist judges, like Judge Easterbrook, must rely on
something other than mere formalist principles in practice. In time,
perhaps psychologists and legal scholars actually will be able to build
fuzzy models of judicial decisionmaking that judges could conceivably
employ to predict the likely societal impact of their decisions.
In the meantime, however, cognitive psychology's theory of
fuzzy logic shall at least provide an illuminating approach to under-
standing legal decision-making. In describing how judges make deci-
sions and how those decisions affect society, we are not doomed to a
choice between mechanistic rules or raw intuition. We should there-
fore resist the false dichotomy between formalism and practical rea-




The operation of fuzzy sets is nicely illustrated in the baseball
context. Suppose, for example, we are attempting to determine the
batting average of a hitter described by baseball pundits as "good."
We might sketch a graph, where the x axis represents the range of
batting averages, and the y axis represents whether a particular
hitter is good. Illustration 1 graphs in this manner the traditional,
bivalent view of a good hitter.
Illustration 1
Player Good Hitter
I I I I I I I I L
.050 .100 .150 .200 .250 .300 .350 .400 .450
BATTING AVERAGE




I I I I I I I I I
.050 .100 .150 .200 .250 .300 .350 .400 .450
BATTING AVERAGE
In Illustration 2, the concept "good" is denoted by a curve of "fit val-
ues"--a number between the "bit values" of zero and one-that, for
each average, provides the degree of membership in the set of good
hitters. Good hitting is a smooth function of average. Every hitter is
a good or not-good hitter to some degree. As such, the graph of "not
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I I I I I ! I I I
.050 .100 .150 .200 .250 .300 .350 .400 .450
BATTING AVERAGE
If Illustrations 2 and 3 are placed on top of each other, they
intersect at the point where "good" equals "not good," where fuzziness
is most explicit.
3 75
The power of fuzzy sets is evidenced by a comparison with
bivalent sets. Bivalent sets are drawn with hard, sharp lines between
being a good and a not-good hitter. In bivalent terms, some hitters
are good and others are not good, and no one hitter is (at the same
time) both. In Illustration 1, we segregate good and not good hitters
at a single point-hitters with an average of .300 or higher were con-
sidered good, and those with an average below .300 were considered
not good. Yet this view does not comport well with reality. Whether a
hitter is good, "like most properties of the world, is a matter of de-
gree. '3 76 Unlike straight lines, curves and fuzzy sets show this smooth
change from good to not good. Fuzzy sets tie words to curves, recog-
nizing that all hitters are good or not good to some degree. The .280
hitter is good and not good, and probably more good than not.
Multivalent logic turns out to be conducive to operating a
complex system. The principles of fuzzy logic are currently being used
to run a subway in Sendai, Japan,377 operate washing machines and
camcorders,378 and adjust automatic transmissions in GM Saturn
375. For a similar model, see Kosko, supra note 303, at 146-55.
376. Id. at 147.
377. Fuzzy logic is used to run the subway system in Sendai, Japan. Each train stops
within 7 cm of the correct spot on the platform and uses 10% less energy than if run by human
operators. See The Logic That Dares Not Speak Its Name, supra note 4, at 90.
378. Washing machines built in Japan and Korea are using fuzzy logic to automatically
adjust washing strategies based on how dirty the clothes and how difficult it is to remove stains.
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automobiles ,379 but how does this happen? Building a fuzzy system
requires three steps: (1) choosing the inputs (X) and the outputs (Y)
for the system; (2) choosing the fuzzy sets that comprise X and Y; and
(3) picking the fuzzy rules that correspond to the fuzzy subsets.8s0
An explanation of a fuzzy system may be useful at this point.3 81
Suppose one wishes to create a car that can sense vehicles or obsta-
cles and automatically brake to avoid an accident. The first step in
creating the fuzzy system requires the system engineer to identify the
fuzzy inputs and outputs. In this case, distance to obstacle would be
the appropriate input (X), while degree of braking would be an appro-
priate output (Y). Thus, by inputting a particular value representing
distance to obstacle, we should get a corresponding change in degree of
braking. If X, then Y.
Next, we need to select the fuzzy sets that comprise distance to
obstacle (X) and degree of braking (Y). We could use FAR, DISTANT,
MEDIUM, NEAR and VERY CLOSE as fuzzy sets of X. The sets




Close Near Medium Distant / Far
0 10 20 25 30 40 50 60 70 75 80 90 100
Meters to Obstacle
We can then use NO BRAKES, SOFTLY, MEDIUM BRAKE,
FIRMLY and HARD as corresponding fuzzy sets for Y. We graphi-
See Kosko & Isaka, supra note 5, at 79. This can be achieved by using an optical sensor which
measures the murkiness of the wash water. This information is then processed by the control-
ler which estimates how long it will take to clean the clothes. A washing machine might use as
few as 10 rules to accomplish this task. Fuzzy logic is also being used to remedy the effects of
hand jitters in camcorders. The fuzzy rules anticipate jitters and automatically compensate for
them. See id.
379. See Long, supra note 6, at 104.
380. See Kosko, supra note 303, at 161-163.




cally represent the sets comprising degree of braking just as we did for
distance to obstacle in Illustration 5. In our example, we might repre-
sent degrees of braking by the values 0 to 100.
Illustration 5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Degree of Braking
The third step consists of choosing the appropriate fuzzy rules.
These rules establish the relationships between the inputs (distance
to obstacle) and the outputs (degree of braking). Thus, if we desire the
vehicle to brake hard whenever an obstacle is extremely close, we
would create the rule, "If the distance to the obstacle is very close,
then brake hard." The following rules would be appropriate for this
model:






If the distance to the obstacle is far, then do not brake.
If the distance to the obstacle is distant, then brake
softly.
If the distance to the obstacle is medium, then brake
medium.
If the distance to the obstacle is near, then brake firmly.
If the distance to the obstacle is very close, then brake
hard.
As seen above in Illustrations 4 and 5, inputs and outputs may
be graphically represented, but what about the fuzzy rules which
represent the interaction between inputs and outputs? In other
words, what does the fuzzy rule "If the distance to the obstacle is far,
brake softly" look like? Quite simply, the product of FAR and
SOFTLY, or one input triangle multiplied by an output triangle, looks
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like a patch.38 2 Indeed, the products of FAR x DO NOT BRAKE,
DISTANT x SOFTLY, MEDIUM DISTANCE x MEDIUM BRAKE,
NEAR x FIRMLY and VERY CLOSE x HARD will result in five over-
lapping patches, as shown in Illustration 7.













100 / F '
t I\ ' I
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Degree of Braking
The size of the patch depends necessarily upon the fuzziness of
the rule-the more precise the rule, the smaller the patch. General
rules create large patches. More specific rules produce smaller
patches. In the car braking example, only five rules were used. In-
deed, an infinite number of rules could be used and as each rule grew
382. See Kosko, supra note 303, at 163-164.
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more precise, so too would the corresponding patch. Fuzzy rules
become less fuzzy as they become more precise. However, the value of
a fuzzy system lies in its inherent ability to utilize fuzzy rules. Oth-
erwise stated, there is no reason to make the rules overly precise-
fuzzy systems are designed to use fuzzy rules such as the five above
without more. Indeed, it has been argued that creating overly precise
rules is counterproductive.3 83 The number of rules should be limited
and increased only when small changes in input have large and
wholesale effects on the output.8 4 The question, then, is how does the
system run when the rules are inherently vague?
Fuzzy systems utilize associative memory, which means that
all of the fuzzy rules are activated at once, or in parallel.3 5 Thus,
when an input (distance to obstacle) is introduced into our fuzzy sys-
tem, all five rules will fire to some degree. "The closer the input
matches the if-part of a fuzzy rule, the more the then-part fires. '38
6
Conversely, the less the input matches the if-part of the fuzzy rule,
the less the then-part is triggered. Suppose the input is 50 meters.
All five rules trigger to some degree. Once the membership of each
output set is calculated (the then-part fuzzy sets), the result is aver-
aged into a single output value. This process is called "defuzzifica-
tion" or "centroid averaging. '38 7 Illustration 8 details this process. By
this manner, the fuzzy system produces a single value which can then
be used by the device, or in our case, the vehicle's braking system.
Fuzzy chips enable this process to occur millions of times per second
through fuzzy logical inferences per second (FLIPS).388 "Each map
from input to output defines one FLIPS. 389 This precision aids the
system in avoiding "hinting"-the tendency to overshoot or under-
shoot based on the lag time between inputs and their resulting out-
puts. 390 Thus, as the vehicle's distance to the obstacle changes by the
second, the braking system can automatically compensate, without
any assistance from the driver, based solely on the five rules govern-
383. See The Logic That Dares Not Speak Its Name, supra note 4, at 91.
384. See id.
385. See Kosko, supra note 303, at 171.
386. Id. at 293.
387. Id. at 172.
388. See id.
389. Id. at 293. The first fuzzy chip was designed by in 1985 and processed 16 rules at a
rate of .08 million rules per second. Current technology allows systems to process up to two
million rules per second. See Kosko & Isaka, supra note 303, at 78.
390. The Logic That Dares Not Speak Its Name, supra note 4, at 90.
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ing it. Bart Kosko calls this entire process fuzzy associative memory
(FAM. 3
91
Illustration 8: FUZZY ASSOCIATIVE MEMORY AT WORK. 392
Rules One through Five
Step 1 If A1 , then B 1  -- B'1 (DO NOT BRAKE to some
degree.)
If A2 , then B2  -- B'2 (BRAKE SOFTLY to some
degree.)
Input X1 ->A->If A3 , then B3 -> B'3 (BRAKE LESS THAN
SOFTLY to some degree.)
If A4 , then B4  --> B'4 (BRAKE FIRMLY to some
degree.)
If A5 , then B 5  -> B' 5 (BRAKE HARD to some
degree.)
Step 2 B'1 + B'2 + B' 3 + B'4 +B'5 = B
Step 8 B-> DEFUZZIFICATION-> Output 'Y1"
391. See Kosko, supra note 303, at 175.
392. A similar representation can be found in Kosko, supra note 303, at 175.
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APPENDIX II
CONNECTION MATRICES FOR DEPRIZIO
The individual matrices appear below:
Trustee's FCM
To: T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
TI 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
T2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Easterbrook's FCM
To: El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
El 0 0 1 1 0 0
£2 0 0 0 0 1 0
E3 0 0 0 0 0 0
From:
E4 0 0 0 0 0 0
E6 0 0 0 0 0 1
£6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Creditor's FCM
To: C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
C10 1 1 0 0 0
C20 0 0 1 0 0
C30 0 0 0 1 0
From: 0 0 0 0 0 1
(:5 0 0 0 0 0 1
50 00 0001
As an augmented FCM, the matrices must be linked together. To
accomplish this task, Easterbrook's nodes E3, E4, and E6, are linked
to the Trustee's nodes T6, T7, and T8, respectively, and nodes E4 and
E6 are linked to the Creditor's nodes C5 and C6 respectively. Since
Easterbrook's textualism and economic theory support the Trustee's
arguments, the edge weights are positive: E3-T6, {+1}; E4-T7, {+1};
and E6-T8, (+1}. On the other hand, Easterbrook's textualism and
economic theory work against the Creditor's arguments and thus the
edge weights are negative: E3-C5, {-1} and E6-C6, {-1}. These edge





1 1 0 0 0 0-0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0:0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0;0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0: 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0*0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0-0 0 0 0 0 0:0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0:0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trustee
Considering the dynamics of this FCM, if the trustee FCM and credi-
tor FCM were allowed to go forth unimpeded, they would both fire
and the case would not be resolved. Easterbrook's theories render a
linear progression through the individual FCMs. The Creditor's FCM
is shut down in the third and fourth layers. Again, an advanced FCM
with edge weights different than {-1, +1} may yield vastly different
results. Here, however, we are only concerned with an introduction to
the fuzzy cognitive map as a tool for judicial decision analysis and the
present {-1, +1} weights suffice.
To create a virtual world FCM of the Deprizio judicial decision-
making process, the connection matrix is multiplied by an input vec-
tor.3 93 The input vector represents "active" nodes, e.g., the trustee has
an argument. The active nodes trigger subsequent events by either
activating or deactivating connected nodes. The output vector con-
tains this information. Thus, behaviors can be determined by exam-
ining the output vector. However, to form the next input vector, the
output vector needs to be modified. After a brief explanation of the
393. See Dickerson & Kosko, supra note 311, at 12, 13.
Creditor
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0"
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 -1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 -1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
1332 [Vol. 52:1243
1999] FUZZY LOGIC 1333
modification procedure, an example will be given that demonstrates
the iterative FCM process.
The input vector needs to be modified where the edge weights
add to greater than {+1}, consider nodes T8 (possibility of {+3}) and C6
(possibility of {+2}), or less than {0}. When these situations occur a
binary threshold function adjusts the values to {+1} or {0}. With y as
the sum of the edge weights, a sigmoid function,
S(y)= 1
1+e-c(y-T)
with a large positive value of c, approximates a binary threshold or
"step" function. 394 Consider the sigmoid function equation when the
threshold value, T, is equal to 0.5 and c = 100. When y, the sum of the
edge weights is greater than {+1}, take {+3} as an example, then
S(3)=S(y)= 1 = S(y) 1 1 since e-250  0.
1+e-1OO(3.o.5) 1+e-250
On the other hand, when y is {-1} or less, take {-3} as an example, then
S(3)=S(y)= 1 = S(y)= 1 0 since e+350 ->
1+e-100(-3-0.5) 1+e+35o
For the simple FCMs described above, the binary threshold function
ensures that each node either does nothing {0} or fires with a value of





In connection matrix form, the nested FCM shown in Illustration 9 is
as follows:
To Nodes:
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
F N1 0 0 -1 -1 0 0
r
o N2 0 0 1 1 0 0
m
N3 1 -1 0 0 0 0
N
o N4 1 -1 0 0 0 0
d
e N5 0 0 1 0 0 0
S
N6 0 0 -1 0 0 0
With weights of {-1, +1}, the simple FCM for the "Insiders and the
Firm" and the "Creditors" settles to different outcomes depending on
what actions are triggered. For example, if "Insider Risk is Low" and
"Creditor Risk is High" then the following steps occur:
Step I Insiders Waive Claim to Firm's Assets & The Firm
Issues Guarantees
Step II Insider Risk is High & Insider Risk is NOT Low
Step III Insiders DO NOT Waive Claim & The Firm DOES
NOT Issue Guarantees
The same process can be represented using the above matrix, E, and
an input vector -T. To start consider the input vector for "Insider Risk
is Low" and "Creditor Risk is High,"
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
1o=10 1 0 0 1 01.
To find the output vector, B0, multiply I0 and E. To multiply a row
vector and a matrix, the elements of the row vector are multiplied by
the column elements of the matrix. For example, the first element of
the six element output vector is computed as follows:
B0(1) = [0*0 + 1*0 + 0*1 + 0*1 + 1*0 + 0*0] = 0
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Continuing this process for elements two through six yields,
NI N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
BoO1 0 2 1 0 01.
Going back to the definitions of N3 and N4, we see that at Step I,
Insiders Waive Claim to Firm's Assets {+2} and The Firm Issues
Guarantees {+1}. The next step applies the binary threshold function
to Bo, which results in the new input vector 11, where
Ni N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
I,=l0 0 1 1 0 01.
The new input vector states that N3 and N4 are activated, a result
already known from examination of the output vector Bo. Repeating
this procedure using the new input vector 11, yields output vector B 1,
where
Ni N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
B1 =12 -2 0 0 0 01.
Translating back to the node definitions, the output vector from Step
II states that the degree of insider risk is switched to High {+2} and
no longer Low {-2}. In essence, this action is a result of nodes N3 and
N4. To move onto the next step, we again apply the binary threshold
function to arrive at the next input vector 12, where
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
12= 11 0 0 0 0 0.
As the input vector shows, only N1 is triggered and this will turn off
nodes N3 and N4, yielding output vector B 2 where
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
B 2 =O 10 -1 -1 0 01.
Applying the threshold function yields the next input vector, 13, where
NI N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
13= 10 0 0 0 0 0.
1999] 1335
1336 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 52:1243
The FCM has now reached a steady state since 13 has no non-zero
elements. One possible interpretation of this result is that the firms
no longer participate in the credit system since their degree of risk is
high. However, over time one may expect the degree of risk to dimin-
ish as other market forces come into play. This presents a situation






















To complete the entire FCM, this connection matrix is joined with the
Deprizio judicial decision connection matrix. The resulting matrix
(not shown) is 29 rows by 29 columns.
395. See K.S. Park & S.H. Kim, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps Considering Time Relationships, 42










Guarantor is an Officer (T2)
Guarantor has a Claim (T3)
Payment made to Creditor (T4)
Claim makes a Creditor (E3)
Payment = Transfer, Benefit is not (E4)
Preserve Whole of Firm (E5)
Payment Benefits Creditor (C2)
Payment Benefits Guarantor (C3)
Third Input Vector:
Guarantor is an Insider (T5)
Guarantor is a Creditor (T6)
Avoidable Transfer Benefits Guarantor (T7)
Creditor Hold Back (E6)
Creditor Transfer is not Avoidable (C4)
Fourth Input Vector:
Trustee can Recover from Creditor or Guarantor (T8)
Fifth Input Vector:
Deprizio (Ri)
Sixth Input Vector: Step I of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Seventh Input Vector: Step II of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Insiders Waive Claim to Assets (R5)
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Eighth Input Vector: Step III of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Insiders Waive Claim to Assets (R5)
Insider Risk is High (R7)
Ninth Input Vector: Step IV of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Insider Risk is High (R7)
Tenth Input Vector: Return to Step I of the Limit Cycle





Payment Benefits Creditor (C2)
Payment Benefits Guarantor (C3)
Third Input Vector:
Creditor Transfer is not Avoidable (C4)
Guarantor Transfer is Avoidable (C5)
Fourth Input Vector:
Trustee Recovers from Guarantor Only (C6)
Fifth Input Vector:
Barking Dog (R2)
Sixth Input Vector: Step I of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is Low (R3)
Preferential Transfers to Insider Backed Creditors (R9)
Seventh Input Vector: Step H of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is Low (R3)
Insider Risk is Low (R8)
Preferential Transfers to Insider Backed Creditors (R9)
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Eighth Input Vector: Step III of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is Low (R3)
Firm Issues Guarantees (R6)
Insider Risk is Low (R8)
Preferential Transfers to Insider Backed Creditors (R9)
Ninth Input Vector: Step IV of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is Low (R3)
Firm Issues Guarantees (R6)
Preferential Transfers to Insider Backed Creditors (R9)
Tenth Input Vector: Return to Step I of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is Low (R3)




Creditor Risk is Low (R3)
Firm Issues Guarantees (R6)
Insider Risk is Low (R8)
Preferential Transfers to Insider Backed Creditors (R9)
Second Input Vector:
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Firm Issues Guarantees (R6)
Third Input Vector: Step III of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Insiders Waive Claim to Assets (R5)
Insider Risk is High (R7)
Fourth Input Vector: Step IV of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Insider Risk is High (R7)
Fifth Input Vector: Step I of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
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Sixth Input Vector: Step II of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Insiders Waive Claim to Assets (R5)
Seventh Input Vector: Return to Step III of the Limit Cycle
Creditor Risk is High (R4)
Insiders Waive Claim to Assets (R5)
Insider Risk is High (R7)
